Edwards continues by answering objections against the Calvinian teaching of the moral necessity of God's will (i.e. that God always necessarily chooses the good and no other). Arminians like Thomas Hobbes have argued that man's freedom of will precludes any moral necessity since it is based on indifference (or neutrality) in decision-making. Therefore, they also assert the same for God. Hobbes offers two lines of reasoning as to how this can be true for God: (1) In many instances there may be no difference between the objects of choice before God and (2) In many instances the difference between objects of choice are negligible. Let's take each in turn.
1. In many instances there may be no difference between the objects of choice before God.
On this line of reasoning Edwards responds:
And here in the first place, it may be worthy to be considered, whether the contradiction there is in the terms of the question proposed, don't give reason to suspect that there is an inconsistence in the thing supposed. 'Tis inquired, whether different objects of choice mayn't be absolutely without difference? If they are absolutely without difference, then how are they different objects of choice? If there be absolutely no difference in any respect, then there is no variety or distinction: for distinction is only by some difference. And if there be no variety among proposed objects of choice, then there is no opportunity for variety of choice, or difference of determination. For that determination of a thing which is not different in any respect, is not a different determination, but the same (385).
Hobbe's offers two defenses of this reasoning. First, he presupposes an infinite measure of time and space from which God chose to cut a piece when he created. The piece that God chose is no different in quality from any other piece. He just happened to choose it. Edwards, answers by pointing out that Hobbes' presupposition of an infinite measure of time and space extending beyond what God created is false. Prior to the creation there was no time and space, only the eternity of God's existence, which is another way of saying, "his immediate, perfect and invariable possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once" (385). To speak of an infitnite expanse of time and space prior to creation is a "groundless imagination" (385). "'Tis as improper, to imagine that the immensity and omnipresence of God is distinguished by a series of miles and leagues, one beyond another; as that the infinite duration of God is distinguished by months and years, one of another," so that "all arguments and objections which are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite extension or duration, are buildings founded on shadows, or castles in the air." (386, 387).
Second, Hobbes defends his view of God's indifference in decision making by pointing out that God's decision to place identical atoms of matter in different parts of the world must have been an indifferent. Edwards answers that it is unlikely, given the infinite divisibility of matter, that any two particles are exactly alike. But even if there are alike particles, the decision of placement need not have anything to do with a comparison between the quality of the particles themselves. The decision of placement would only have the difference of place in mind. In other words, God did not choose that water particle A be in one place and an identical water particle B be in another due to any difference between them, for that would be impossible given they are identical. God chose that a water particle should be in place A and a water particle should be in place B. The difference of particles is then subsequent to the difference of placement alone. In other words, God did not have particle A and particle B before him and then deside where to put them. He simply decided that there should be water particles in places A and B and not C and D. The duplicity of particles is derived from the prior decision of placement alone.
N.B. God's decision to use identical created objects differently does not presume indifference in his decision. In order for a decision to be made between the use of two different objects considered in themselves, those objects must be different in themselves. Otherwise, a decision that involves the different use of identical objects must have some other difference in view (e.g. difference of place or time), prior to and as the ground of the distinction between the objects.
2. In many instances the difference between objects of choice are negligible.On this line of reasoning Edwards answers, "It is impossible for us to determine with any certainty or evidence, that because the difference is very small, and appears of no consideration, therefore there is absolutely no superior goodness, and no valuable end which can be proposed by the creator and governor of the world, in ordering such a difference" (392). Even the influence of the attraction of one atom in the universe, which may seem insignificant in itself, could have major consequences in the scope of history.
N.B. We can have no certainty that minute differences do not lead to major consequences. On the contrary, it can be demonstrated that the minutest of differences can have major consequences over time.
Edwards continues this section by addressing some of Hobbes' other arguments against the moral necessity of divine decision-making. Hobbes has asserted that if the divine will is necessarily determined by "a superior fitness," then the freeness of God's grace and goodness is derogated. Therefore our thankfulness for his benefits is also derogated. Edwards offers four answers to this charge. First, moral necessity in decision making does not detract from the goodness of God any more than to suppose that his decisions are determined by chance with no design whatsoever. Second, Edwards acknowledges that if God's decision to favor some creatures over others due to some good in them, then the freeness of his grace would be derogated. But this is no argument for indifference in God's gracious decision. God can still have some end in view outside the creature which makes his decision with respect to the creature of superior fitness to its absence or opposite. Third, no one would claim that God
never has some wise design in view in choosing the objects of his favor. Edwards explains: "The Apostle himself mentions one end.
1 Timothy 1:15,
1 Timothy 1:16: "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on him to life everlasting." But yet the Apostle never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of divine grace in his election, which he so often and so greatly magnifies" (394). Fourth, God's decision to favor some rather than others may actually have the effect of magnifying the beauty of his grace and the thankfulness of its objects. Edwards writes:
God may choose this object rather than another, as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs and inclinations of his goodness; being more sinful, and so more miserable and necessitous than others; the inclinations of infinite mercy and benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious design of God's sending his Son into the world may be more abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy towards such an object, rather than another (395).
N.B. The freeness of God's grace is not derogated by the moral necessity of his decision-making because (1) the supposition that his decisions are random and purposeless is at least as derogatory, (2) while his election of some is unconditional with respect to their goodness, it is not necessarily without some superior fitness in the plan of God, (3) there are instances where God clearly bestows his grace with some superior end in view, which in no way derogates the grace bestowed, and (4) God's decision to favor some (e.g. the weak and destitute) rather than others (e.g. the strong and well endowed) may actually serve to magnify his grace and goodness freely bestowed.
Edwards finishes this section with a brilliant analysis of the logical end of the Arminian understanding of free will (i.e. that it is based on decisional indifference). He writes:
One thing more I would observe, before I finish what I have to say on the head of the necessity of the acts of God's will; and that is, that something much more like a servile subjection of the divine being to fatal necessity, will follow from Arminian principles, than from the doctrines which they oppose. For they (at least most of them) suppose, with respect to all events that happen in the moral world depending on the volitions of moral agents, which are the most important events of the universe, to which all others are subordinate; I say, they suppose with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any purposes or decrees of his about them. And if so, they have a fixed certain futurity, prior to any designs or volitions of his, and independent on them, and to which his volitions must be subject, as he would wisely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the state of things in the moral world. So that here, instead of a moral necessity of God's will, arising from or consisting in the infinite perfection and blessedness of the divine Being, we have a fixed unalterable state of things, properly distinct from the perfect nature of the divine mind, and the state of the divine will and design, and entirely independent on these things, and which they have no hand in, because they are prior to them; and which God's will is truly subject to, being obliged to conform or accommodate himself to it, in all his purposes and decrees, and in everything he does in his disposals and government of the world; the moral world being the end of the natural; so that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to that state of the moral world, which consists in, or depends upon the acts and state of the wills of moral agents, which had a fixed futurition from eternity. Such a subjection to necessity as this, would truly argue an inferiority and servitude, that would be unworthy of the supreme Being; and is much more agreeable to the notion which many of the heathen had of fate, as above the gods, than that moral necessity of fitness and wisdom which has been spoken of; and is truly repugnant to the absolute sovereignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy of his will; and really subjects the will of the most High to the will of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon them (395-96).
N.B. The Arminian understanding of divine decision-making is fatalistic. If God knows future events, then they must come to pass. And if these future events are not based on the personal plans of the divine being, then they are no different from the machinations of some impersonal force, which is fatalism.