The Oxford Companion to Philosophy describes Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) as "perhaps the most important European philosopher of modern times." Kant was born and died in Konigsberg, East Prussia. In his masterpiece
A Critique of Pure Reason, he worked to formulate a
metaphysic (i.e. an answer to the question: What is the basis of reality or being?) that neither touted the simple analytical (i.e. self-referentially provable, e.g. "I am myself" or "God is omnipotent") assertions of
rationalism or degenerated into the abject skepticism (i.e. self-referential incoherence, e.g. "I truly know that I cannot truly know") of
empiricism. S
lowly plodding my way through
The Cambridge Companion to Kant, I came across something very interesting today.
Kant was especially motivated by two desires in his work to formulate a new metaphysic. On the one hand, he wanted to rescue science from radical skepticism, the logical conclusion of a thoroughgoing empiricism. On the other hand, he wanted to maintain the possibility for autonomous human decision-making, which he felt was a logical prerequisite for morality. But these two desires result in an antinomy. In order to rescue science from skepticism and give it a basis for certainty, one must establish universal coherence via some law of causation, which undermines human autonomy. Likewise, in order to maintain the possibility of human autonomy, one must allow for freedom from the law of causation (i.e. incoherence), which undermines scientific certainty.
To resolve this dilemma Kant postulated two spheres of reality: the phenomenal and the noumenal. The phenomenal is the sphere of the perceivable; the noumenal is the sphere beyond the perceivable. The phenomenal is where human reason is able to operate properly; the noumenal is beyond reason. The phenomenal is the realm of causation, the noumenal is beyond causation. The phenomenal is the realm of certainty; the noumenal is unknowable. By postulating these two spheres of reality, Kant was able to offer certainty for scientific knowledge via normative (though not technically universal) coherence while leaving room for autonomous human decision making. In other words, by postulating two different senses of reality he was able to hold proposition A and proposition non-A simultaneously (i.e. the law of non-contradiction).
Kant wrote (my comments in
red):
On a hasty overview of this work one will believe himself to perceive that its use is only negative, namely that we can never dare to exceed the bounds of experience (the phenomenal sphere) with speculative reason, and that it is indeed its first use. But this then becomes positive if one becomes aware that the principles with which speculative reason dares to exceed its bounds would not in fact have the inevitable result of extending but, more closely considered, that of restricting our use of reason, in that they would really extend the bounds of sensibility (the phenomenal sphere), to which they actually belong, to everything, and so threaten to obstruct the pure (practical) use of reason (scientific certainty). Thus a critique, which, limits the former, is so far to be sure negative, but, insofar as it removes a hindrance that threatens to restrict or even destroy the latter use of reason (using reason with respect to the noumenal sphere), is in fact of positive and very important use, as soon as one is convinced that it yields an entirely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral use) (human autonomy), in which it is unavoidably extended beyond the limits of sensibility (the noumenal sphere), but thereby requires no help from speculative reason, but must nevertheless be secured from its opposition in order not to land in contradiction with itself (A Critique of Pure Reason, B xxiv-xxv, as quoted in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, 12-13).
It seems to me that the problem with Kant's view (besides its faulty presuppositions like neutral human observation and morality presupposing autonomy,
et al.) is that in postulating these two spheres and offering certainty of knowledge through one of them, he made the other unknowable. And guess where God is? In the unknowable sphere.
My former historical theology professor,
Dr. John D. Hannah, was fond of saying, "If there's a Hell's hall of fame, Immanuel Kant is the door keeper." I think he may be right. Kant's metaphysic opened the door for the radical secularization of western education and culture. Why study or worship God when he can't be known?
Nietzsche may have officiated God's funeral, but Kant dug his grave.