FRANCIS TURRETIN ON JUSTIFICATION

In 1994 Presbyterian and Reformed (P&R) Publishing reprinted a section of Francis Turretin's Institutes of Elenctic Theology translated by George Musgrave Geiger and edited by James T. Dennison, Jr. It is entitled Justification.

Turretin (1623-1687) was the preeminent Reformed theologian of an era of church history known as Protestant Scholasticism. Born and educated in Geneva, Switzerland, he was a defender and systematizer of Calvinist theology just two generations after Calvin's death. Much of his defense of Calvinism was focused against Moises Amyraut (1596-1664) and the theological tradition he founded known as Amyraldianism or the School of Saumur (the French city where Amyraut taught). Amyraut modified the Calvinism formally issued in the Canons of Dordt by denying the doctrine of definite atonement (i.e. that Christ died to actually atone for the sins of the elect). Instead he taught indefinite (or hypothetical) atonement (i.e. that Christ died to make the atonement of sins possible for all people). Turretin's systematization of Calvinist theology was completed in his magnum opus Institutes of Elenctic Theology (1679-1685). The word "elenctic" comes from the Greek word ἔλεγχος which means cross-examination or questioning for the purpose of refutation. It is a literary method of inquiry that began with Plato's account of Socrates' dialogues. Turretin's Institutes employ this method. Questions are posed in order to draw out the distinctions between Calvinist theology and Roman Catholic, Arminian, and Socinian theologies. The Institutes of Elenctic Theology was the theology textbook used at Princeton until Charles Hodge's Systematic Theology (1871-1873) replaced it.

In the 2004 introduction to Justification R.C. Sproul writes of Turretin and the Protestant Scholastic project:

In our day mention of Scholasticism, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, is greeted by a curled lip and a snarl. Our culture, so heavily influenced by the categories of existenetial philosophy, has a palpable animus toward all things rational. That theology might be carried out in a rigorous logical style seems almost irreligious and unspiritual. Thinking gives way to feeling and clarity gives way to confusion. . . .

These charges, however, reveal much more of our own era than they do of Turretin's. They tend to be made by people who are allergic to intellectual precision and prefer the comfort zone of ambiguity. But if we hold sacred the notion that God has created us with minds for the purpose of seeking understanding, then we will delight in the clarity and precision of thought Turretin's work presents to us. . . .

He embodied the ancient adage: pi bene distinquit, bene docet. (Who distinguished well, teaches well.) . . .

People try to transcend the issue of justification that separates Roman Catholics and Protestants by saying, "We believe that we are justified by the righteousness of Christ." Both sides agree on this formulation while at the same time understanding it radically differently. By the righteousness of Christ, Rome means the infusion of Christ's righteousness into the believer which when co-operated with assists a person to become actually righteous. The Protestant understands the formula to refer to the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to the account of the believer. The difference between these two is the essence of the Reformation debate, then and now. . . .

Church history testifies that the studied ambiguity is the refuge of the heretic. If he can blur his meaning, he can safely continue to slither along on his belly. . . .

The entire Roman Catholic structure of salvation is utterly incompatible with the biblical gospel. No one shows this more clearly than Francis Turretin.

Here are a few of my favorite excerpts from Turretin on justification:

I confess that God in declaring just ought also for that very reason to make just so that his judgment may be according to truth. But man can be made just in two ways: either in himself or in another; either from the law or from the gospel. God therefore makes him just whom he justifies; not in himself, as if from a sight of his inherent righteousness he declared him just, but from the view of the righteousness imputed--in Christ (7).

The question is not whether inherent righteousness is infused into us through the grace of Christ, by whose intervention we are made partakers of the divine nature (2 Peter 1:4) and obtain a true and real holiness pleasing and acceptable to God, by which we are properly denominated just and holy. For whatever the opponents may calumniously charge upon the orthodox (to wit, that "we allow of no inherent righteousness," as Bellarmine), it is surely a most foul calumny. Its falsity is proved from the writings of our divines whether public or private, in which everywhere and with common consent they teach that the benefits of justification and sanctification are so indissolubly connected with each other that God justifies no one without equally santifying him and giving inherent righteousness by the creating of a new man in true righteousness and holiness. But the question is whether that inherent righteousness (such as exists in believers on earth) enters into our justification, either as its cause or as a part, so that it constitutes some part of our justification and is the meritorious cause and foundation of our absolving sentence in the judgment of God (11).

For the righteousness of Christ alone imputed to us is the foundation and meritorious cause upon which our absolutary sentence rests, so that for no other reason does God bestow the pardon of sin and the right to life than on account of the most perfect righteousness of Christ imputed to us and apprehended by faith. Hence it is readily gathered that we have not here a mere dispute about words (as some falsely imagine), but a controversy most real and indeed of the highest moment. In it we treat of the principal foundation of our salvation, which being overthrown or weakened, all our confidence and consolation both in life and in death must necessarily perish (13).

Nor ought it to be objected "that this absolute perfection was required under the law, but is not required under the gospel." The relaxation made under the gospel does not extend do far that an imperfect righteousness can be accepted for a perfect righteousness. Rather it consists in this--that the vicarious and the alien righteousness of a surety is admitted for our own (15).

It involves a contradiction to say that man is justified at the same time by inherent righteousness and by remission of sins, as it is most absurd (asystaton) for one to be justified in himself and in another (by personal and by another's obedience) (20).

It is impossible by a quality of finite virtue and worth for an offense of infinite indignity to be blotted out and compensated for (21).

The gospel teaches that what could not be found in us and was to be sought in another, could be found nowhere else than in Christ, the God-man (theanthropo); who taking upon himself the office of surety most fully satisfied the justice of God by his perfect obedience and thus brought to us an everlasting righteousness by which alone we can be justified before God; in order that covered and clothed with that garment as thought it were our first-born (like Jacob), we may obtain under it the eternal blessing of our heavenly Father (29).

In a twofold way Christ imparts his blessings to us, by a forensic imputation, and a moral and internal infusion (29).

Therefore when we say that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us for justification and that we are just before God thorugh imputed righteousness and not through any righteousness inherent in us, we mean nothing else than that the obedience of Christ rendered in our name to God the Father is so given to us by God that it is reckoned to be truly ours and that it is the sole and only righteousness on account of and by the merit of which we are absolved from the guilt of our sins and obtain a right to life; and that there is in us no righteousness or good works by which we can deserve such great benefits which can bear the severe examination of the divine court, if God willed to deal with us according to the rigor of his law; that we can oppose nothing to it except the merit and satisfaction of Christ, in which alone, terrified by the consciousness of sin, we can find a safe refuge against the divine wrath and peace for our souls (31-32).

We hold these two benefits to be inseparable: that no one is justified by Christ who is not also sanctified and gifted with inherent righteousness (from which believers can truly be denominated holy and righteous although not perfectly in this life) (32).

If Christ is Jehovah, our righteousness, and if he is made to us righteousness by the Father, this is not said with respect to essential righteousness, but to the obedience which is imputed to us for righteousness. This is called the righteousness of God because it belongs to his divine person and so is of infinite value and is highly pleasing and acceptable to God. By this righteousness then, we understand the entire obedience of Christ--of his life as well as of his death, active as well as passive (35).

The act of one cannot be made the act of many, except by imputation (36).

Christ is the righteousness by which we are justified (37).

Christ was made sin for us, not inherently or subjectively (because he knew no sin), but imputatively (because God imputed to him our sins and made the iniquities of us all to meet on him, Isa. 53:6). Therefore, we also are made righteousness, not by infusion, but by imputation (38).

A justification of the ungodly cannot be made by infusion, but by imputation (40).

Christ ought not only to restore the goods lost in Adam, but also to remove the evils contracted through Adam. Now there were two--guilt and corruption of nature--to which two goods should be opposed: the imputation of righteousness to take away guilt before God; and a renovation of nature to heal inherent corruption. Again, Christ not only restored the lost goods, but in a far more excellent way. We lost mutable righteousness, but an immutable righteousness is restored to us. We lost only an inherent righteousness and there is given us an imputed ritheousness with an inherent, without which we could not be made partakers of the inherent. Otherwise if nothing was restored in Christ than what had been lost in Adam, pardon of sin would not be given to us in Christ because it was not lost in Adam (41-42).

Although the imputed righteousness of Christ is maintained by us to be the foundation of our justification before God, it does not on that account cease to be purely gratuitous on our part. It is a mere gift of God's mercy because the sponsor is given to us of God and was substituted in our place and because his obedience and righteousness (which we ourselves ought to have rendered from the rigor of the law) is reckoned ours and imputed to us by God (44).

Nor is it more absurd for the righteousness of Christ to be extrinsic to us and yet to be imputed to us than it is absurd for our sins to be extrinsic to Christ and yet to be imputed to Christ for punishment (44-45).

As the disobedience of Adam truly constituted us sinners by imputation, so also the righteousness of Christ truly justifies us by imputation. Thus "imputed" is properly opposed to "inherent," but not to "true" because we do not invent an imputation consisting in a mere opinion and fiction of law; but one which is in the highest sense real and true. Yet this truth belongs to imputation, not to infusion; is juridical, not moral (45).

It is one thing to redeem from punishment; another to bestow life and happiness. It is one thing to bring out of prison; another to seat upon a throne. The former takes away evil, but the latter superadds the good also; as if a fugitive slave should not only be acquitted of the punishment due, but also raised to the dignity and right of a son (50).

The remission of sins does not consist in a removal of the corruption or depraved quality, but in a gratuitous pardon of the criminality and guilt arising from it (55).

Scripture . . . never says that Christ satisfied that he might acquire for us the power to satisfy, but by himself (di' heautou) made expiation for sins, and thus reconciled us to God and freed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us (60).

This full and total remission of sins being established, the treasury of papal indulgences and that most foul trafficking of the mystery of iniquity is swept away (62).

God adopts us, not because we are good, but to make us good (69).

Nor is adoption here to be confounded with our union with Christ. For although it necessarily flows from it as its cause and foundation (since from union with Christ depends the communion of all his benefits, of justification and of sanctification and of glory), still it cannot (if we wish to speak accurately) be identified with it. Rather it stands related to it as an effect to its cause (71).

Scripture nowhere says that God willed to count our faith for righteousness, but that he made Christ unto us righteousness; that he is Jehovah our righteousness and that we are the righteousness of God in him (75-76).

We are not justified except by perfect righteousness. For we have to deal with the strict justice of God, which cannot be deceived (76).

It is one thing for blessings to be conferred according to faith (i.e., under the condition of faith) under which they are promised in the word and which we acknowledge with the Scriptures; another for faith to justify properly and by itself or to count faith itself for righteousness and thus to impute it for righteousness and thus to impute it for righteousness to the believer. There faith holds the relation of an instrument. Here, however, it holds that of a principal cause and foundation (which we deny) (78).

Faith is said to save us (Luke 7:50), not by meriting something in order to justification, but only receptively and organically because it was the instrument receptive of that benefit (80).

[Faith] justifies in no other manner than by its being directed to the death and obedience of Christ (81).

The question is not whether solitary faith (i.e., separation from the other virtues) justifies (which we grant could not easily be the case, since it is not even true and living faith); but whether it "alone" (sola) concurs to the act of justification (which we assert); as the eye alone sees, but not when torn out of the body. Thus the particle "alone" (sola) does not determine the subject, but the predicate (i.e., "faith only does not justify" [sola fides non justificat], but "faith justifies alone" [fides justificat sola]. The coexistence of love in him who is justified is not denied; but its coefficiency or co-operation in justification is denied (88).

It is one thing for love and works to be required in the person who is justified (which we grant); another in the act itself or causality of justification (which we deny). If works are required as concomitants of faith, they are not on that account determined to be causes of justification with faith or to do the very thing which faith does in this matter (93).

Light and heat in the sun are most closely connected together, but still the light alone illuminates, the heat alone warms. Therefore, although the other virtues do not justify with faith, still faith cannot justify in their absence, much less the opposite vices be present. For faith cannot be true except in connection with the virtues (which if they do not contribute to justification, still contribute to the existence of life and faith, which the presence of vices would destroy) (94).

The justification by which God loved us ought to precede our love (95).

The expectation of salvation is founded upon a hope so certain to be fulfilled in its own time, as if we already possessed salvation itself (96).

Since Paul and James were inspired by the same Spirit, they cannot be said to oppose each other on the doctrine of justification, so that one should ascribe justification to faith alone and the other to works also. The reconciliation is not difficult, if the design of each be considered and the natures of faith and of justification (concerning which both treat) be attended. Paul disputes against the Pharisees, who urged the merits of works; James disputes against the Libertines and Epicureans, who, content with a profession of faith alone, denied not only the merits of works, but also their necessity. Against the former, Paul rightly urges faith alone for justification. Against the latter, James properly commends the necessity of works for the confirmation of justification (97).

WHAT IS HERESY?

Martin Downes answers this question here and here.

CAN SOMETHING COME OUT OF NOTHING?

R.C. Sproul recently interviewed Ben Stein about the topic of his new movie Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed. The documentary exposes the neo-Darwinian movement within academia to filter out all teachers who question the Darwinian presupposition that something can come out of nothing, which is nonsense. I can't wait to see this movie.

A GOOD WORD FROM DR. NIEL NIELSON

Are you free to choose boldly?

FRIDAY EDWARDS EXCERPT: True Love to God Depends on His Absolute Sovereignty

This morning I read the first chapter of Roger Olson's book Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities. My initial thought is that Olson comes across as overly didactic, as Carl Trueman has pointed out in his review. Also his view contra Richard Muller that Arminius's perspective was widespread and accepted in the early Reformed church is highly questionable. Nonetheless, Olson makes many good observations; he certainly knows historic Arminian theology. I recommend his book to anyone wanting to understand historic Arminianism as its adherents understand it, which, as Olson demonstrates, isn't always the case among those who critique it.

In the first chapter "Myth 1: Arminianism is the opposite of Calvinist/Reformed Theology" Olson traces out several doctrines he feels Arminianism and Calvinism share in common. So far I've found that many of the points of similarity he sees are only equivocal. In other words, the general terminology employed by both systems is the same, but the definitions are different. The most fundamental definitional difference is with regard to the concept of freedom (see this earlier post for more on defining freedom). Olson leaves the term to be defined by implication rather than actually giving the Arminian definition. That is problematic. It could easily mislead the non-initiated reader into thinking that equivocal similarities are univocal.

I also found one of Olson's points at the end of chapter one particularly troubling. After attempting to establish some commonalities between Calvinism and Arminianism he offers what he feels is the key distinction--divergent emphases.

Calvinism's stress on God's sovereignty, human depravity and the gratuity of grace in salvation, though not absent from Arminian thought, provides a positive reminder of truths modern culture too easily brushes aside. Similarly, Arminian theology underscores and highlights God's love and mercy, which is often lacking (though not totally absent) in other Protestant theologies (59-60).

I appreciate Olson's irenic tone and apparent desire to acknowledge strengths even in divergent systems of belief, but is his distinction true? I don't think it is. Calvinism does not stress the love and mercy of God less than Arminianism. Calvinism rightly understands the love and mercy of God to be complementary to "God's sovereignty, human depravity and the gratuity of grace in salvation." This is subtle yet important to understand: through the good intention of magnifying the love and mercy of God, Arminian theologians actually vitiate it by denying the sovereignty of God over the human will at a point. I know the Arminian would not say it this way since he would define divine sovereignty as being compatible with divine self-limitation, but we must at some point move beyond equivocation to definition. According to Calvinism, a God who would limit himself at any point would undermine the very basis of his creatures' love for him, not to mention his own love for himself.

Jonathan Edwards recognizes this point in his sermon "The Spirit of Charity is an Humble Spirit" (1 Corinthian 13:4,5):

Divine love implies humility, because, when God is truly loved, he is loved as an infinite superior. True love to God is not love to him as an equal; for every one that truly loves God, honours [sic] him as God, that is, as a being infinitely superior to all others in greatness and excellence. It is love to a being who is infinitely perfect in all his attributes, the supreme Lord and absolute Sovereign of the universe (Charity and Its Fruits,147, emphasis added).

WHAT IS THE SIN THAT LEADS TO DEATH?

Interpreters have puzzled over this question ever since the Apostle John wrote:

If anyone sees his brother committing a sin not leading to death, he shall ask, and God will give him life—to those who commit sins that do not lead to death. There is sin that leads to death; I do not say that one should pray for that. All wrongdoing is sin, but there is sin that does not lead to death (1 John 5:16-17).

What does John mean when he speaks of "sin that leads to death"? Some interpreters, beginning with Origin, have understood it in terms of human intention. In other words, John is distinguishing between willful sins and sins of ignorance. Others, beginning with Augustine, have understood it as the blasphemy of the Holy Spirit that Jesus refers to in Matthew 12:31, Mark 3:29, and Luke 12:10. Jesus says: "Therefore I tell you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven, but the blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven" (Matthew 12:31). Still others (e.g. Roman Catholics) have understood it in terms of severity. John is distinguishing between venial (i.e. less severe) and mortal (i.e. more severe) sins. Each option offers a resolution to the difficult teaching of John, but which is right?

The third option, has nothing to commend it if one is committed to biblical authority and sufficiency. Sin is not distinguished as venial or mortal anywhere else in Scripture. The first and second at least have the broader biblical context going for them. The Mosaic law did distinguish between willful sins and sins of ignorance, and Jesus does speak of an unforgivable sin. But these options are lacking in that they don't take the context of 1 John into proper consideration. Why would John point back to the distinction of willful sins and sins of ignorance or recall the unforgivable sin of blaspheming the Holy Spirit? How would that fit into the argument of his epistle against the anti-Christian denial of the fleshiness of Jesus Christ? The simple fact is they don't. It makes little since to understand his statement in either of those ways.

I would like to propose another option: the sin that leads to death is persistence in rejecting the gospel that the Word became flesh. Commentator Colin Kruse (Pillar New Testament Commentary, The Letters of John) supports this option. Kruse also points to an article by Tim Ward published in 1995 which supports this option.

Many see similarities between the heresy John warns against in his epistles and an early second century heresy called docetism (Kruse, Schnackenburg). Docetism comes from the Greek word dokeo which means "to seem or appear." It is, simply put, the denial of the fleshiness of Jesus Christ. In other words, it is the denial that Jesus had a human body. Jesus only seemed or appeared to have a human body, but he was really only a spirit. John writes: "By this you know the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is from God, and every spirit that does not confess Jesus is not from God. This is the spirit of the antichrist, which you heard was coming and now is in the world already" (1 John 2:2-4). And again, "For many deceivers have gone out into the world, those who do not confess the coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh. Such a one is the deceiver and the antichrist" (2 John 7). This is why he opens his first epistle writing about the Jesus which the he and the original disciples had "touched with [their] hands" (1 John 1:1).

Docetism was defined by a dualistic worldview that pitted the material against the spiritual. Spirit was viewed as good; matter was viewed as evil. Thus the docetists rejected the doctrine of the incarnation, that the Word became flesh. The good Son of God could not have become evil flesh. Docetists spoke of the matter-spirit duality in terms of good and evil, light and darkness, knowledge and ignorance, truth and error, corruptible and incorruptible, life and death, etc.

The Apostle John used docetic images when he argued against the false teachers writing: "This is the message we have heard from him and proclaim to you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all" (1 John 1:5); "Whoever says "I know him" but does not keep his commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him" (1 John 2:4); "It is a new commandment that I am writing to you, which is true in him and in you, because the darkness is passing away and the true light is already shining. Whoever says he is in the light and hates his brother is still in darkness. Whoever loves his brother abides in the light, and in him there is no cause for stumbling. But whoever hates his brother is in the darkness and walks in the darkness, and does not know where he is going, because the darkness has blinded his eyes" (1 John 2: 8-11); "And everyone who thus hopes in him purifies himself as he is pure" (1 John 3:3); "We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brothers" (1 John 3:14); "By this we know the Spirit of truth and the spirit of error" (1 John 4:6b); "And this is the testimony, that God gave us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. Whoever has the Son has life; whoever does not have the Son of God does not have life" (1 John 5:11-12).

That last excerpt is, I think, crucial in understanding what John means by the "sin that leads to death," which he writes about just a few verses later. John teaches that life comes by union with the Son. "God has given us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. Whoever has the Son has life." Likewise he teaches that death comes by lack of union with the Son. "Whoever does not have the Son of God does not have life." There are two categories in view:

1. Union with Christ => Forgiveness and Life
   
2. Lack of union with Christ => Condemnation and Death
   

Though they are sinful, God has given believers forgiveness and life in Christ. How? They have been forgiven by believing the gospel that the Son became flesh to die as a propitiation on their behalf (1 John 2:2). Forgiveness and life come by believing the gospel that the Word became flesh. There is no forgiveness available for those who persist in rejecting that truth, only condemnation and death. The sin that leads to death is persistence in rejecting the truth that the Son of God became flesh.

Therefore John writes: "If anyone sees his brother committing a sin not leading to death, he shall ask, and God will give him life—to those who commit sins that do not lead to death. There is sin that leads to death; I do not say that one should pray for that. All wrongdoing is sin, but there is sin that does not lead to death" (1 John 5:16-17). In other words, if anyone sees his brother committing a sin other than persistence in rejecting the fleshiness of Jesus Christ, he should pray for God to forgive that sin and restore him to joyful communion with Christ and with his fellow brothers in the community. But if anyone sees his brother persisting in rejecting the fleshiness of Jesus (i.e. sinning unto death), he should not pray for God to forgive that sin much less restore him to a communion of life in Christ he has never enjoyed. Forgiveness is only available through accepting the gospel that the Word became flesh, not through rejecting it. Life is only available through union with Christ, not through a lack of union. To ask God to forgive the sin of persistence in rejecting the gospel of the fleshiness of Christ is a contradiction. A modern day equivalent would be to ask God to forgive the sin of the Muslim in spite of his false religion. It would be like asking God to forgive a person apart from belief in the gospel of the incarnate Son of God. There is no forgiveness outside of Christ, only condemnation. There is no life outside of Christ, only death.

In conclusion let's consider two possible objections.

Objection 1: Does this mean that if one rejects the gospel of the incarnate Son at any point in his life, there is no hope for him? I hope not, because then I and many others would be out! I rejected the gospel prior to my conversion, and I don't think my story is unique in that respect. Instead, the interpretation above teaches that there is no hope for one who persists in rejecting the gospel while he persists, because their is no forgiveness apart from accepting the doctrine that the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.

Objection 2: Does this mean that Christians should not pray for one who is currently persisting in rejecting the gospel of the incarnate Son? No, not at all. Christians should certainly pray for everyone who persist in rejecting the gospel. But what should we pray for? Should we pray that God would forgive the sin of his persistent rejection of the gospel? Of course not! Forgiveness only comes by accepting the gospel. Christians should pray that God would open the rejecter's eyes to see the beauty of the triune God, so that the rejecter would accept the gospel and find forgiveness and life in union with Christ. The sin that leads to death is persistence in rejecting the gospel of the incarnate Son; life comes by accepting the gospel and finding forgiveness in Christ.

[Also posted at CRM]

WHY STUDY THE REFORMERS?

Hughes Oliphant Old writes in Worship: Reformed According to Scripture:

One often asks why today we should study the Reformers. We study the Reformers for the same reason the Reformers studied the church fathers. They are witnesses to the authority of Scripture (p. 4).

And, I would add respectfully, they are witnesses of God's faithfulness to his church.

GEMS FROM J. GRESHAM MACHEN

J. Gresham Machen was among those professors who broke away from Princeton Seminary to found Westminster Seminary in 1929. He was also the founder of todays Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC) which is a sister denomination to the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA).

I just finished his book Christianity and Liberalism. It is excellent. In many respects it defines the Liberal-Conservative disagreement of his times. His thesis is simple: Liberalism--defined as a diminution of external authorities and an emphasis on created nature as our rule of faith and life--is not just another form of Christianity, it is a different religion altogether. He argues his thesis by demonstrating the differences between liberalism and Christianity in six areas: (1) Doctrine, (2) God and Man, (3) The Bible, (4) Christ, (5) Salvation, and (6) The Church. Below are a few of my favorite excerpts from each of these six areas.

Doctrine

Few desires on the part of religious teachers have been more harmfully exaggerated than the desire to "avoid giving offense."

According to the Christian conception, a creed is not a mere expression of Christian experience, but on the contrary it is a setting forth of those facts upon which experience is based.

Christ will do everything or nothing, and the only hope is to throw ourselves unreservedly on His mercy and trust Him for all.

"Christ died"--that is history; "Christ died for our sins"--that is doctrine. Without these two elements, joined in an absolutely indissoluble union, there is no Christianity.

The great weapon with which the disciples of Jesus set out to conquer the world was not a mere comprehension of eternal principles; it was an historical message, and account of something that had recently happened, it was the message, "He is risen."

We shall never have vital contact with Jesus if we attend only to His person and neglect the message; for it is the message which makes Him ours.

Here is found the most fundamental difference between liberalism and Christianity--liberalism is altogether in the imperative mood; while Christianity begins with a triumphant indicative; liberalism appeals to man's will, while Christianity announces, first, a gracious act of God.

If the Church were led to wipe out all products of the thinking of nineteen Christian centuries and start fresh, the loss, even if the Bible were retained, would be immense.

Where the most eloquent exhortation fails, the simple story of an event succeeds; the lives of men are transformed by a piece of news.

God and Man

At the very root of the modern liberal movement is the loss of the consciousness of sin.

Christianity means that sin is faced once for all, and then is cast, by the grace of God, forever into the depths of the sea. The trouble with the paganism of ancient Greece, as with the paganism of modern times, was not in the superstructure, which was glorious, but in the foundation, which was rotten. There was always something to be covered up; the enthusiasm of the architect was maintained only by ignoring the disturbing fact of sin. In Christianity, on the other hand, nothing needs to be covered up. The fact of sin is faced squarely once for all, and is dealt with by the grace of God. But then, after sin has been removed by the grace of God, the Christian can proceed to develop joyously every faculty that God has given him. Such is the higher Christian humanism--a humanism founded not upon human pride but upon divine grace.

The fundamental fault of the modern Church is that she is busily engaged in an absolutely impossible task--she is busily engaged in calling the righteous to repentance. Modern preachers are trying to bring men into the Church without requiring them to relinquish their pride; they are trying to help them avoid the conviction of sin. The preacher gets up into the pulpit, opens the Bible, and addresses the congregation somewhat as follows: "You people are very good," he says; "you respond to every appeal that looks toward the welfare of the community. Now we have in the Bible--especially in the life of Jesus--something so good that we believe it is good enough even for you good people." Such is modern preaching. It is heard every Sunday in thousands of pulpits. But it is entirely futile. Even our Lord did not call the righteous to repentance, and probably we shall be no more successful than He.

The Bible

The real authority, for liberalism, can only be "the Christian consciousness" or "Christian experience." But how shall the findings of the Christian consciousness be established? Surely not by a majority vote of the organized church. Such a method would obviously do away with all liberty of conscience. The only authority, then, can be individual experience; truth can only be that which "helps" the individual man. Such an authority is obviously no authority at all; for individual experience is endlessly diverse, and when once truth is regarded only as that which works at any particular time, it ceases to be truth. The result is abysmal skepticism.

Christ

Jesus did not invite the confidence of men by minimizing the load which he offered to bear.

The modern liberal preacher reverences Jesus; he has the name of Jesus forever on his lips; he speaks of Jesus as the supreme revelation of God; he enters, or tries to enter, into the religious life of Jesus. But he does not stand in a religious relation to Jesus. Jesus for him is an example of faith, not the object of faith.

The truth is that if Jesus be merely an example, he is not a worthy example; for He claimed to be far more.

The New Testament without miracles would be far easier to believe. But the trouble is, it would not be worth believing. Without the miracles the New testament would contain an account of a holy man--not a perfect man, it is true, for He was led to make lofty claims to which he had no right--but a man at least far holier than the rest of men. But of what benefit would such a man, and the death which marked His failure, be to us?

According to the modern liberal Church, Jesus differs from the rest of men only in degree and not in kind; He can be divine only if all men are divine.

The Jesus of the New Testament has at least one advantage over the Jesus of modern reconstruction--He is real.

Salvation

Liberalism finds salvation (so far as it is willing to speak at all of "salvation") in man; Christianity finds it in an act of God.

It never seems to occur to modern liberals that in deriding the Christian doctrine of the Cross, they are trampling upon human hearts.

If religion be made independent of history there is no such thing as a gospel. For "gospel" means "good news," tidings, information about something that has happened. A gospel independent of history is a contradiction in terms.

Modern liberalism, placing Jesus alongside other benefactors of mankind, is perfectly inoffensive in the modern world. All men speak well of it. It is entirely inoffensive. But it is also entirely futile. The offense of the Cross is done away, but so is the glory and the power.

If a man has once come under a true conviction of sin, he will have little difficulty with the doctrine of the Cross.

Religion cannot be made joyful simply by looking on the bright side of God. For a one-sided God is not a real God, and it is the real God alone who can satisfy the longing of our soul.

It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God. Were we not safer with a God of our own devising--love and only love, a Father and nothing else, one before whom we could stand in our own merit without fear? He who will may be satisfied with such a God. But we, God help us--sinful as we are, we would see Jehovah. Despairing, hoping, trembling, half-doubting and half-believing, trusting all to Jesus, we venture into the presence of the very God. And in His presence we live.

If Christian faith is based upon truth, then it is not the faith which saves the Christian but the object of the faith. And the object of the faith is Christ.

Christianity is not engrossed by this transitory world, but measures all things by the thought of eternity.

According to Christian belief, man exists for the sake of God; according to the liberal Church, in practice if not in theory, God exists for the sake of man.

The liberal believes that applied Christianity is all there is to Christianity, Christianity being merely a way of life; the Christian man believes that applied Christianity is the result of an initial act of God.

The Church

A solid building cannot be constructed when all the materials are faulty; a blessed society cannot be formed out of men still under the curse of sin. Human institutions are really to be molded, not by Christian principles accepted by the unsaved, but by Christian men; the true transformation of society will come by the influence of those who have themselves been redeemed.

The Church is the highest Christian answer to the social needs of man.

Nothing engenders strife so much as forced unity, within the same organization, of those who disagree fundamentally in aim.

There is sometimes a salutary lack of logic which prevents the whole of a man's faith being destroyed when he has given up a part.

Truth cannot be stated clearly at all without being set over against error.

It is never kind to encourage a man to enter into a life of dishonesty.

An outstanding fact of recent Church history is the appalling growth of ignorance in the Church.

There is in the Christian life no room for despair. Only, our hopefulness should not be founded on the sand. It should be founded, not upon a blind ignorance of the danger, but solely upon the precious promises of God.

FRIDAY EDWARDS EXCERPT: On the immediate agency of God in effecting the continuous existence of created substances

From Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin:

That God does, by his immediate power, uphold every created substance in being, will be manifest, if we consider that their present existence is a dependent existence, and therefore is an effect and must have some cause; and the cause must be one of these two; either the antecedent existence of the same substance, or else the power of the Creator. But it cannot be the antecedent existence of the same substance. For instance, the existence of the body of the moon, at this present moment, cannot be the effect of its existence at the last foregoing moment. For not only was what existed the last moment, no active cause, but wholly a passive thing; but this also is to be considered, that no cause can produce effects in a time and place in which itself is not. It is plain, nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing. But the moon’s past existence was neither where nor when its present existence is. In point of time, what is past entirely ceases, when present existence begins; otherwise it would not be past. The past moment has ceased, and is gone, when the present moment takes place; and no more coexists with it, than any other moment that had ceased, twenty years ago. Nor could the past existence of the particles of this moving body produce effects in any other place, than where it then was. But its existence at the present moment, in every point of it, is in a different place, from where its existence was at the last preceding moment. From these things, I suppose, it will certainly follow, that the present existence, either of this, or any other created substance, cannot be an effect of its past existence. The existences (so to speak) of an effect, or thing dependent, in different parts of space or duration, though ever so near one to another, do not at all co-exist one with the other; and therefore are as truly different effects, as if those parts of space and duration were ever so far asunder. And the prior existence can no more be the proper cause of the new existence, in the next moment, or next part of space, than if it had been in an age before, or at a thousand miles’ distance, without any existence to fill up the intermediate time or space. Therefore the existence of created substances, in each successive moment, must be the effect of the immediate agency, will, and power of God.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PATRISTICS

Tony Reinke has interviewed PCA minister Ligon Duncan on the importance of Patristic studies for evangelical pastors. It is excellent! Check it out here.

[HT: Ref21]

WHY I AM NOT A COMPATIBILIST: What is freedom?

It is my belief that divine omnipotence, divine omnicausality, human free will, and human moral responsibility are fundamental givens of the created order. But how should we understand these doctrines? How do they relate to one another?

Two terms often used to describe their relationship are libertarianism and compatibilism. Libertarianism teaches that divine causation must be limited in order for humans to be morally responsible, so that God is not the ultimate cause of the decisions we make. On the other hand, compatibilism teaches that divine omnicausality and human moral responsibility are compatible.

Given these two options, I find myself in agreement with compatibilism. But is compatibility the best way to understand the relationship? Are the doctrines merely compatible? In my view, the term compatible is a little soft. It seems to communicate something like: "Sure, I affirm both doctrines, and I also affirm that God and his revelation are non-contradictory. Therefore I must say they are at least compatible, though it is beyond me to understand how it could be so."

I would like to propose another term to describe the relationship between divine omnipotence and human free will. I believe human free will and moral responsibility are actually dependent on divine omnipotence and omnicausality. Rather than simple compatibilism, I think a better term is complementarianism. Though I don't disagree with compatibilism in principle, I would rather be more precise in labeling my view.

Definitions

The root of the word omnipotent is the Latin potens. Potens carries a semantic range that includes ability (i.e. potential) and power. Thus some theologians understand the doctrine divine omnipotence as teaching that God is able to do all things, while others have understood it to mean that God is the ultimate controller or power behind all things. While of course there is some overlap between the ideas (i.e. to be able to do anything could imply power and to be all-powerful could imply the ability to do anything), nonetheless they are, I think, rightly distinguished. Omnipotence could be understood in the sense of ability without requiring that God be a cause of all events (e.g. Arminianism). On the other hand, omnipotence could also be understood to require omnicausality (e.g. Calvinism). But who is right? Should we understand divine omnipotence in the sense of ability or power? Ultimately that will depend on how we define the concept of freedom.

Power and Freedom

Libertarian theologians understand divine omnipotence in the sense of ability. God is omnipotent because he is able to do all things. This understanding ultimately betrays a flawed definition of freedom akin to that of the nominalists of late medieval philosophy (i.e. William of Ockham). The nominalists defined freedom as the ability or potential to choose between a multiplicity of options. God is utterly free, and therefore omnipotent, because he can choose between an infinite number of options. But is this a proper definition of freedom?

According to Scripture, freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options. Indeed Jesus warns his disciples saying: “Enter by the narrow gate. For the gate is wide and the way is easy that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many” (Matt. 7:13). Surely an implied aspect of the wideness of the wide gate is the multiplicity of options from which one can choose there, and yet the wide gate is not the way to true freedom. Jesus tells his disciples, “The truth will set you free” (John 8:32b). The word translated "truth" is singular. In other words, there is one truth, one option, that is freeing not multiple options. Paul sums up the biblical teaching (i.e. the gospel) from Genesis forward writing: “But thanks be to God, that you who were once slaves of sin have become obedient from the heart to the standard of teaching to which you were committed, and, having been set free from sin, have become slaves of righteousness” (Rom 6:17-18). The Apostle Paul describes freedom as slavery. Is slavery the proper metaphor to communicate the multiplicity of one's options? Of course not! Slavery communicates just the opposite, a limitation of options. Slavery diminishes one's options to the singular will of the master; yet Paul describes true freedom as slavery to the will of God. These examples clearly contradict the notion that freedom is the ability to choose from a multiplicity of options. As J. Gresham Machen once wrote:

Dependence upon a word of man would be slavish, but dependence upon God's word is life. Dark and gloomy would be the world, if we were left to our own devices, and had no blessed Word of God. The Bible, to the Christian, is not a burdensome law, but the very Magna Charta of Christian liberty" (Christianity and Liberalism, 78-79).

The consistent biblical teaching seems to be this: Freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options—that is tyranny; freedom is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option.

Should we then understand that God is free because he has the ability to choose from an infinite number of options? Or should we understand divine freedom as the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option (i.e. what accords with the perfect divine character)? I think the latter is preferable. In other words, the freedom of God is the consistency of God’s prevailing inclination to never deny (or contradict) himself. To state it positively, the freedom of God is the consistency of God’s prevailing inclination to always accomplish his purposes. And God is powerful in the sense that his inclination can never be frustrated. His power is the unassailableness of his intended purpose. In all things, he accomplishes (i.e. power) exactly what he purposes (i.e. causes); thus divine omnipotence presumes divine omnicausality. The doctrine of divine omnipotence is not a matter of potentiality; it is a matter of actuality. It is not a matter of neutrality but inclinational consistency. The question is not, strictly speaking, what could God do? It is what would God do or, even better, what has God done? Keeping this in mind . . .

Causation and Responsibility

This is no proof of the doctrines of divine omnipotence and divine omnicausality nor should it be. It is simply a description of them. Proving the doctrines would undermine my assertion that they are fundamental givens. We must begin with these concepts. In other words, we all acknowledge that some power must be behind all created things. The creation, by definition, is not self-existent. We also all acknowledge that effects, by definition, have causes. In other words, the creation is not self-generating.

The question then becomes, who is responsible for causing these effects? Since the effects include evil, some systems, assuming only one sense of causal responsibility, opt for dualism when answering this question. That is what my post on The Arminian Demiurge was about. But the question, Who is responsible for causing these effects? begs an even more fundamental question: What is responsibility?

Libertarianism teaches that the concept of responsibility must carry only one causal sense, namely, primacy. In order for an agent, whether human or divine, to be responsible for his action he must be the primary (or initiating) cause of that action. There can be no cause of the action prior to the agent himself.

This of course presumes that morally responsible causation occurs from a vantage point of ultimate neutrality. When presented with a moral decision, in order to choose as a prime cause, the agent must have no prior inclination to choose any particular option. In other words, any prior inclination or bias is viewed as undermining causal primacy, because the inclination itself becomes primary. Thus if the agent isn't ultimately neutral, he is not the primary cause of the action, his choice was not really free, and responsibility is vitiated. Neutrality is the first principle of libertarian ethics.

It is not difficult to see how the supposed ideal of neutrality comports with the flawed definition of freedom. If freedom is the ability to choose from a multiplicity of options, ability presupposes neutrality. At this point my approach diverges from libertarianism at a most fundamental level.

I do not believe neutrality is either achievable or desirable for created or non-created willing. True freedom is not founded upon neutrality; it is founded upon inclination. It is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option. This definition of freedom also applies to God who is perfectly inclined toward knowing, valuing, and doing according his own holy character.

Given this definition of freedom, I am free to posit more than one sense of causation with respect to moral responsibility in order to account for the existence of evil in the creation without giving up divine omnicausality. There is a sense in which God is the primary cause of all things (i.e. omnicausality), including the moral decisions of his image bearers. But there is also a secondary sense in which human beings are properly considered causes of all their actions, and herein lies human moral responsibility.

As secondary causes, we are responsible for our actions because our decision to act is based on our prevailing inclination. In other words, ultimately we always and only do what we want. If our inclination is, by God’s foreordination, in accord with his moral law, then the act is right and good. If it is, by God’s foreordination, out of accord with his moral law, then it is sin. Again, in both cases responsibility hinges on prevailing inclination. That God is the primary cause of what we do in no way interferes with the fact that we do whatever we want and, therefore, does not nullify our responsibility.

And this in NO way impugns the character of God. If God has ordained that we have sinful inclinations at one moment in time so that we necessarily sin, he is not thereby liable for sinning himself. Why? Because God is not motivated by a sinful inclination in ordaining the sinful inclinations of his creatures. He is motivated by perfectly pure, holy, and righteous inclinations. God always and only does what he wants, and what he wants is always in accord with his righteous character. While the sinful inclination in the creature is no doubt evil in itself, its existence within larger redemptive history is not evil when viewed from God's perspective. God is able to be the primary cause of all things (i.e. omnicausality), even the sinful decisions of his moral creatures, without violating either his righteous character or our moral responsibility.

In fact apart from divine causation we could not be responsible since he is the ultimate cause of all our inclinations, whether by positively acting upon our hearts so that we are inclined toward him (i.e. the good) or by leaving us to inclinations directed against him and toward something else (i.e. the bad). In this way we see how divine omnicausality and human responsibility are not just compatible but complementary.

The same goes for divine omnipotence and human freedom. Freedom is the consistency of inclination to choose the right option. Because that consistency is ultimately maintained by the power of God at work in our lives, freedom is dependent on divine omnipotence. In other words, we are slaves by nature. Freedom is slavery to righteousness. What we need is to be submitted to a good master so that he directs our every move. That is true freedom.

Summary

What I have tied to say above is basically this:

True freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options—that is tyranny; it is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option.

The above definition seeks to explain the relationship between the doctrines of divine omnipotence, divine omnicausality, human free will, and human moral responsibility by moving beyond what has traditionally been called compatibilism to complementarianism. I also intend to demonstrate the difference between the libertarian, compatibilist, and complementarian understandings with regard to the same doctrines. Here is a breakdown of key relationships within each system:

Key:

= equals
=> allows
<=> necessitates

Libertarianism

1. Human moral responsibility <=> Human free will
   
2. Human free will <=> Limited divine causality
   
3. Limited divine causality => Divine all-ability
   
4. Divine all-ability = Divine omnipotence
   

Compatibilism

1. Human moral responsibility <=> Human free will
   
2. Human free will => Divine omnicausality
   
3. Divine omnicausality <=> Divine all-power
   
4. Divine all-power = Divine omnipotence
   

Complementarianism

1. Human moral responsibility <=> Human free will
   
2. Human free will <=> Divine omnicausality
   
3. Divine omnicausality <=> Divine all-power
4. Divine all-power = Divine omnipotence
   

The chief difference is seen across all three spectra at point 2. For libertarianism, human free will necessitates limited divine causality. For compatibilism, human free will allows divine omnicausality. For complementarianism, human free will necessitates divine omnicausality.

Conclusion

Given these relationships, my primary complaint against compatibilism is that it doesn't explicitly integrate a definition of freedom with respect to human free will. It simply affirms the compatibility (i.e. an allowance) between human freedom and divine omnicausality without defining what freedom actually is. That is a significant weakness.

Libertarianism and complementarianism, on the other hand, are more explicitly integrative accounts of divine-human relations. What distinguishes them from one another is their respective definitions of freedom. Libertarianism teaches that freedom is the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options. Complementarianism teaches that freedom is the consistency of inclination to choose the right option.

Complementarianism is not at odds with compatibilism; it is just more precise. That is why I am not a compatibilist. I am a complementarian.

[The essence of the above thinking is not unique though my expression of it may be. Most of my thinking on this subject comes from Jonathan Edwards's work Freedom of the Will.]

THE BUSHWHACKER: Hacking through forests of confusion about writing

My friend and colleague Stephanie Barker began a blog back in 2005 called The Bushwhacker. Stephanie is an English whiz who works on staff at PCPC in communications. She is editor of our weekly magazine This Week. Her blog is meant to be a help to other writers in issues of grammar and style. As an aspiring writer, (Should there be a comma there? Let's see) I am very appreciative of Stephanie's help. She just began a series of posts called Hyphens and dashes. Do you know the difference? Stop by her blog and you will.

FRIDAY EDWARDS EXCERPT: On the Indissoluble Connection Between Nature and Propensity

I've decided to change the name of this post series from FRIDAY EDWARDS QUOTE to FRIDAY EDWARDS EXCERPT. I typically don't share a quick quote from Edwards but an aspect of an argument he has mounted, which is, more properly speaking, an excerpt. Also the beauty of using the word excerpt is that it carries a broader range of meaning; thus any quick quote I might offer could still be considered an excerpt.

From Original Sin, part 1, section 2:

If any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in its proper place, or in the situation which God has assigned it in the universe, it is of any evil nature. That part of the system is not good, which is not good in its place in the system; and those inherent qualities of that part of the system, which are not good, but corrupt, in that place, are justly looked upon as evil inherent qualities. That propensity is truly esteemed to belong to the nature of any being, or to be inherent in it, that is the necessary consequence of its nature, considered together with its proper situation in the universal system of existence, whether that propensity be good or bad. It is the nature of a stone to be heavy; but yet, if it were placed, as it might be, at a distance from this world, it would have no such quality. But being a stone, is of such a nature, that it will have this quality or tendency, in its proper place, in this world, where God has made it, it is properly looked upon as a propensity belonging to its nature. And if it be a good propensity here, in its proper place, then it is a good quality of its nature; but if it be contrariwise, it is an evil natural quality. So, if mankind are of such a nature, that they have an universal effectual tendency to sin and ruin in this world, where God has made and placed them, this is to be looked upon as a pernicious tendency belonging to their nature. There is, perhaps, scarce any such thing, in beings not independent and self-existent, as any power or tendency, but what has some dependence on other beings, with which they stand connected in the universal system of existence. Propensities are no propensities, any otherwise, than as taken with their objects.

In the past year I have discussed with a colleague whether it is proper to describe humanity as having a sin nature. In my mind the language of "sin nature" is a bit loose. What is meant? Do we mean that sin is itself an aspect of human nature? I don't think we can say that, since we would then have to say that Adam was not human prior to the fall (i.e. his nature was missing the sin aspect). So what do we mean by the term "sin nature"? The Westminster Confession 6.2 describes what is meant this way:

By this sin [Adam and Eve] fell from their original righteousness and communion, with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the parts and faculties of soul and body.

Sin is not described as being an aspect of human nature; it is a defilement (or corruption) of human nature (i.e. "all the parts and faculties of body and soul"). In other words, it is a state of nature.

One could take the same distinction above as an argument against total depravity, which is what the Arminians of Edwards's day did. They argued that humanity is not depraved but good by nature. Humans just happen to find themselves in an environment that tends to promote sin. That is why there is an observable universal propensity toward sin.

Edwards counters that argument in the excerpt above with this idea: "nature" and "state of nature" are fundamentally related. In other words, while it is proper to distinguish between "nature" and "state of nature," it is not proper to separate them, which is what the Arminians had done. What is a necessary consequence of nature given its particular state is properly thought of as belonging to nature. To put it more bluntly, if human nature is necessarily prone to sin in its current state, then that proneness is itself properly considered to belong to the nature, though it is not to be considered an aspect of human nature itself. We have sin natures in the sense that, given our current state (i.e. defilement), we are sinful by (i.e. by means of) nature.

MISCELLANIES 1: Proposing a Continuum for Epistemological Theories

From now on, when I journal my own creative thinking on theoretical theological-philosophical concepts, I will title them "Miscellanies." The method and title are by no means original. One of my favorite dead teachers, Jonathan Edwards, kept a journal for the same purpose with the same title.

I've posted these sorts of thoughts-in-process on this blog in the past. It has been a very beneficial exercise for my own growth in understanding and, I pray, it is in some small way a demonstration of an aspect of the glory of God in his image bearers.

Please remember these are thoughts-in-process; therefore, they are by definition non-definitive. That means both the author and readers should remain highly critical of these works. I invite readers to offer any critiques that come to mind. What follows is a proposal with regard to categorizing epistemological (i.e. the study of knowing) theories.

1. Proposing a Continuum for Epistemological Theories.

The unqualified infinite requires, and perhaps could even be defined as, an unqualified primary referent.[1] To use apophatic terms, when we conceive the concept of absolute infinity we are bound, so to speak, to think in terms of timelessness and/or spacelessness, since time and space require multiple referents by definition. We could further simplify by defining time as bodies moving through space; therefore, the unqualified infinite is conceived of more simply as spacelessness. Speaking in terms of Cartesian coordinate geometry, the unqualified infinite is a single point. It is non-dimensional.

On the other hand, the finite requires, and perhaps could even be defined as, a multiplicity of referents. In other words, when we conceive of what it means to be finite we are bound to think in terms of beginnings and endings. We could further simplify by defining a beginning as a regressive end in opposition to a progressive end; therefore the finite is conceived of more simply as endings. Speaking in terms of Cartesian coordinate geometry, the finite is a series of related points (e.g. lines, planes, or volumes). It is dimensional.

I say all that to say this: we finite creatures are fundamentally defined by multiple referents. We simply cannot operate as an unqualified primary referent. We are fundamentally relational creatures.

With respect to the epistemological theories of the enlightenment, which have been broadly categorized as rationalism (i.e. viewing human reason as the first principle of knowing), we see that humanity distrusted all external referents and attempted to know as an unqualified primary referent. In other words, we see that humanity fundamentally ignored its relational nature and embraced a radical individualism in order to know on its own terms. This radical individualism, as Hume demonstrated, led to unqualified skepticism, undermining all certainty of knowledge.

Christian epistemology, however, recognizes the relational nature of humanity. Anselm spoke of Christian knowing as "faith seeking understanding." In other words, knowing must begin with faith. What is faith? It is trusting an external referent. Faith presupposes multiple referents. It presupposes relations.

Given the argument above, I propose that we might rightly place all epistemological theories on a continuum bound by these two poles:

1. Individualism- viewing oneself as an unqualified primary referent, rejecting faith, yielding no basis for certainty (i.e. skepticism), ultimately undermining understanding.
   
2. Relationalism- viewing oneself as fundamentally related to multiple referents (the primary being the infinite triune God), requiring faith, yielding a basis for certainty, ultimately establishing understanding.

One clarification comes to mind as I wrap this up. The description of relationalism above is not meant to speak to the issue of the quality of knowledge. It is only meant to speak to the fact and certainty of it. The quality of knowledge (e.g. whether it is true in whatever sense) is dependent on further factors, particularly the ultimate object of one's faith.

_______________


1. I have modified the term "infinite" with the term "unqualified" in order to remove senses from the discussion. One could argue that theoretically there is such a thing as an infinite line, plane, or volume. No doubt, those are real examples of infinity, in a sense. They are infinite in the sense of endlessness, which implies a qualification according to the finite (i.e. ultimately immeasurable multiple referents), but not spacelessness, which implies no such qualification.