Continuing from Part 1 . . .
Last time we saw that Edwards ends Part Two by challenging the Arminian definition of freedom (i.e. the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options [ability being understood as indifference]). He wrote of this definition:
Throughout Freedom Edwards offers a different definition: Freedom is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option.
Part 3- Wherein is Inquired, Whether Any Such Liberty of Will as Arminians Hold, Be Necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise, and Dispraise, etc.
In Part Three Edwards examines and challenges the Arminian notion that moral decision-making is dependent on freedom as they have defined it.
First he demonstrates that God's moral agency requires no such freedom. God is a moral agent absolutely worthy of our praise and adoration, yet he is necessarily so, which contradicts the Arminian teaching. Given the Arminian definition of freedom as prerequisite to moral agency Edwards writes:
N.B. God's moral agency is true even though he is necessarily holy; therefore necessity does not contradict moral agency as the Arminians say.
Likewise, Edwards argues that the acts of Jesus, which are our righteousness, were necessary, yet truly virtuous.
N.B. Jesus' moral agency is true even though he is necessarily holy; therefore necessity does not contradict moral agency as the Arminians say.
Next Edwards points to those who have been hardened and to fallen man in general. Though they sin of necessity, they are still considered blameworthy. Here Edwards uncovers a fundamental inconsistency in the Arminian scheme.
N.B. The moral agency of hardened sinners and fallen man in general is true even though it is necessary; therefore necessity does not contradict moral agency as the Arminians say.
Arminian theologians maintain that God would be unjust to require anything beyond our present power and ability to do. But they also hold that man is unable to obey perfectly. Christ died in order to offer satisfaction for our imperfections, thus providing a way that our imperfections might be acceptable. Here is the inconsistency:
(1) It would be unjust for God to require what we cannot perform.
(2) We cannot perform perfect obedience.
(3) Therefore Christ died that our imperfection might be accepted as perfect.
If (1), then why is (3) needed to repair (2)? It can't be, hence the inconsistency. Edwards writes:
N.B. Given the necessary imperfection of man's obedience in his fallen state, the doctrine that moral agency is dependent on Arminian freedom undermines the doctrine of satisfaction by atonement. In other words, if moral agency is vitiated by necessity, and man is necessarily imperfect in his obedience, then there is no justice to be satisfied in our failure.
Edwards continues in the next section examining the Arminian charge that moral inability is inconsistent with obligation. He begins by exposing the inherent problem of the Arminian doctrine of self-determination. In order for that doctrine to hold, the will itself cannot be the object of God's command. In other words, in order for the Arminian doctrine to be true, the will itself cannot be placed under obligation, since obedience or disobedience would contradict its freedom. Again, here's the inconsistency:
(1) One's will must be self-determined in order to be obligated to obey the commands of another.
(2) Obedience is having one's will submitted to the will of another.
(3) In order for one to obey, self-determination must be relinquished.
Therefore, according to Arminiansim . . .
(4) By means of self-determination one is obligated by God's command to relinquish self-determination.
or
(5) By obeying God's command one relinquishes his obligation to obey.
Therefore, ironically, rather than being inconsistent with moral inability, command and obligation are actually inconsistent with self-determination. Edwards writes:
N.B. Rather than being the basis for obligation, self-determination is inconsistent with obligation, because, in order to meet the obligation, one must give up self-determination, which would in turn remove the obligation.
In the next section Edwards deals with the Arminian teaching that if a person is sincerely in his desire to believe, yet never performs a spiritual duties like repentance of sin, love to God, and acceptance of Christ, then he is not blameworthy in the omission. For instance, a drunkard who really wants to do the right thing, but cannot, would not be responsible for his omission. Among other things, Edwards criticizes the false-understanding of Arminian decision-making behind this teaching.
N.B. Sincerity of desire does not preclude the obligation to perform duties, because sincerity cannot be separated from performance.
Next Edwards exposes the fallacy of supposing indifference in decision-making is prerequisite to virtue. He appeals to common sense in this matter.
Last time we saw that Edwards ends Part Two by challenging the Arminian definition of freedom (i.e. the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options [ability being understood as indifference]). He wrote of this definition:
The notion mankind have conceived of liberty, is some dignity or privilege, something worth claiming. But what dignity or privilege is there, in being given up to such a wild contingence as this, to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently and unreasonably, and as much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception as the smoke that is driven by the wind (273)!
Throughout Freedom Edwards offers a different definition: Freedom is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option.
Part 3- Wherein is Inquired, Whether Any Such Liberty of Will as Arminians Hold, Be Necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise, and Dispraise, etc.
In Part Three Edwards examines and challenges the Arminian notion that moral decision-making is dependent on freedom as they have defined it.
First he demonstrates that God's moral agency requires no such freedom. God is a moral agent absolutely worthy of our praise and adoration, yet he is necessarily so, which contradicts the Arminian teaching. Given the Arminian definition of freedom as prerequisite to moral agency Edwards writes:
The infinitely holy God, who always used to be esteemed by God's people, not only virtuous, but a being in whom is all possible virtue, and every virtue in the most absolute purity and perfection, and in infinitely greater brightness and amiableness than in any creature; the most perfect pattern of virtue, and the fountain from whom all others' virtue is but as beams from the sun; and who has been supposed to be, on the account of his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honored, admired, commended, extolled and praised, than any creature; and he who is thus everywhere represented in Scripture; I say, this being, according to this notion of Dr. Whitby, and other Arminians, has no virtue at all; virtue, when ascribed to him, is but "an empty name"; and he is deserving of no commendation or praise; because he is under necessity, he can't avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it. It seems, the holiness, justice, faithfulness, etc. of the most High, must not be accounted to be of the nature of that which is virtuous and praiseworthy. They will not deny, that these things in God are good; but then we must understand them, that they are no more virtuous, or of the nature of anything commendable, than the good that is in any other being that is not a moral agent; as the brightness of the sun, and the fertility of the earth are good, but not virtuous, because these properties are necessary to these bodies, and not the fruit of self-determining power (278).
N.B. God's moral agency is true even though he is necessarily holy; therefore necessity does not contradict moral agency as the Arminians say.
Likewise, Edwards argues that the acts of Jesus, which are our righteousness, were necessary, yet truly virtuous.
How strange would it be to hear any Christian assert, that the holy and excellent temper and behavior of Jesus Christ, and that obedience which he performed under such great trials, was not virtuous or praiseworthy; because his will was not free ad utrumque, to either holiness or sin, but was unalterably determined to one; that upon this account, there is no virtue at all, in all Christ's humility, meekness, patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the world, heavenly-mindedness, submission to the will of God, perfect obedience to his commands (though he was obedient unto death, even the death of the cross), his great compassion to the afflicted, his unparalleled love to mankind, his faithfulness to God and man, under such great trials; his praying for his enemies, even when nailing him to the cross; that "virtue," when applied to these things, "is but an empty name"; that there was no merit in any of these things; that is, that Christ was "worthy" of nothing at all on the account of them, worthy of no reward, no praise, no honor or respect from God or man; because his will was not indifferent, and free either to these things, or the contrary; but under such a strong inclination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it impossible that he should choose the contrary; that upon this account (to use Dr. Whitby's language) "it would be sensibly unreasonable" that the human nature should be rewarded for any of these things (290-91)!
N.B. Jesus' moral agency is true even though he is necessarily holy; therefore necessity does not contradict moral agency as the Arminians say.
Next Edwards points to those who have been hardened and to fallen man in general. Though they sin of necessity, they are still considered blameworthy. Here Edwards uncovers a fundamental inconsistency in the Arminian scheme.
N.B. The moral agency of hardened sinners and fallen man in general is true even though it is necessary; therefore necessity does not contradict moral agency as the Arminians say.
Arminian theologians maintain that God would be unjust to require anything beyond our present power and ability to do. But they also hold that man is unable to obey perfectly. Christ died in order to offer satisfaction for our imperfections, thus providing a way that our imperfections might be acceptable. Here is the inconsistency:
(1) It would be unjust for God to require what we cannot perform.
(2) We cannot perform perfect obedience.
(3) Therefore Christ died that our imperfection might be accepted as perfect.
If (1), then why is (3) needed to repair (2)? It can't be, hence the inconsistency. Edwards writes:
They say, it would not be just in God to require of us perfect obedience, because it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or to punish us for failing of it. And therefore, by their own scheme, the imperfections of our obedience don't deserve to be punished. What need therefore of Christ's dying, to satisfy for them? What need of his suffering, to satisfy for that which is no fault, and in its own nature deserves no suffering? What need of Christ's dying, to purchase, that our imperfect obedience should be accepted, when according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other obedience than imperfect should be required? What need of Christ's dying to make way for God's accepting such an obedience, as it would be unjust in him not to accept? Is there any need of Christ's dying, to prevail with God not to do unrighteously? If it be said, that Christ died to satisfy that old law for us, that so we might not be under it, but that there might be room for our being under a more mild law; still I would inquire, what need of Christ's dying that we might not be under a law, which (by their principles) it would be in itself unjust that we should be under, whether Christ had died or no, because in our present state we are not able to keep it (300-01)?
N.B. Given the necessary imperfection of man's obedience in his fallen state, the doctrine that moral agency is dependent on Arminian freedom undermines the doctrine of satisfaction by atonement. In other words, if moral agency is vitiated by necessity, and man is necessarily imperfect in his obedience, then there is no justice to be satisfied in our failure.
Edwards continues in the next section examining the Arminian charge that moral inability is inconsistent with obligation. He begins by exposing the inherent problem of the Arminian doctrine of self-determination. In order for that doctrine to hold, the will itself cannot be the object of God's command. In other words, in order for the Arminian doctrine to be true, the will itself cannot be placed under obligation, since obedience or disobedience would contradict its freedom. Again, here's the inconsistency:
(1) One's will must be self-determined in order to be obligated to obey the commands of another.
(2) Obedience is having one's will submitted to the will of another.
(3) In order for one to obey, self-determination must be relinquished.
Therefore, according to Arminiansim . . .
(4) By means of self-determination one is obligated by God's command to relinquish self-determination.
or
(5) By obeying God's command one relinquishes his obligation to obey.
Therefore, ironically, rather than being inconsistent with moral inability, command and obligation are actually inconsistent with self-determination. Edwards writes:
And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the will consisting in the soul's determining its own acts of will, instead of being essential to moral agency, and to men's being the subjects of moral government, is utterly inconsistent with it. For if the soul determines all its acts of will, it is therein subject to no command or moral government (303).
N.B. Rather than being the basis for obligation, self-determination is inconsistent with obligation, because, in order to meet the obligation, one must give up self-determination, which would in turn remove the obligation.
In the next section Edwards deals with the Arminian teaching that if a person is sincerely in his desire to believe, yet never performs a spiritual duties like repentance of sin, love to God, and acceptance of Christ, then he is not blameworthy in the omission. For instance, a drunkard who really wants to do the right thing, but cannot, would not be responsible for his omission. Among other things, Edwards criticizes the false-understanding of Arminian decision-making behind this teaching.
What is here supposed, is a great mistake, and gross absurdity; even that men may sincerely choose and desire those spiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, rejection, etc. consisting in the exercise of the will itself, or in the disposition and inclination of the heart; and yet not be able to perform or exert them. This is absurd, because 'tis absurd to suppose that a man should directly, properly and sincerely incline to have an inclination, which at the same time is contrary to his inclination: for that is to suppose him not to be inclined to that which he is inclined to (312).
N.B. Sincerity of desire does not preclude the obligation to perform duties, because sincerity cannot be separated from performance.
Next Edwards exposes the fallacy of supposing indifference in decision-making is prerequisite to virtue. He appeals to common sense in this matter.
If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that there may be an act of will in a state of indifference; for instance, this act, viz. the will's determining to put itself out of a state of indifference, and give itself a preponderation one way, then it would follow, on Arminian principles, that this act or determination of the will is that alone wherein virtue consists, because this only is performed while the mind remains in a state of indifference, and so in a state of liberty: for when once the mind is put out of its equilibrium, it is no longer in such a state; and therefore all the acts which follow afterwards, proceeding from bias, can have the nature neither of virtue nor vice. Or if the thing which the will can do, while yet in a state of indifference, and so of liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to take the matter into consideration, then this determination is that alone wherein virtue consists, and not proceeding to action after the scale is turned by consideration. So that it will follow from these principles, all that is done after the mind, by any means, is once out of its equilibrium and already possessed by an inclination, and arising from that inclination, has nothing of the nature of virtue or vice, and is worthy of neither blame nor praise. But how plainly contrary is this to the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion they have of sincerely virtuous actions? Which is, that they are actions which proceed from a heart well disposed and inclined; and the stronger, and the more fixed and determined the good disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of virtue, and so the more of the truth and reality of it. But if there be any acts which are done in a state of equilibrium, or spring immediately from perfect indifference and coldness of heart, they cannot arise from any good principle or disposition in the heart; and consequently, according to common sense, have no sincere goodness in 'em, having no virtue of heart in 'em. To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favors virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it (320-21).
N.B. Indifference is not prerequisite to virtuous decision-making; it destroys it. Truly virtuous decisions are sourced in strong inclinations, the stronger the inclination, the more virtuous the act.
In fact, the Arminian doctrine of freedom is opposed to all motivation or inducement to moral virtue, since, in order for the motivation to take hold, the will must give up its self-determination thus robbing the decision and any subsequent acts of any real virtue. In other words, if neutrality of will is the seat of moral agency, the one true basis of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, virtue or vice, then any persuasion to any sort of action, which would by definition sway the will from its neutrality, would undermine the very thing for which it was intended (i.e. virtue or vice). Therefore, Edwards writes:
So it clearly follows from these principles, that God has no hand in any man's virtue, nor does at all promote it, either by a physical or moral influence; that none of the moral methods he uses with men to promote virtue in the world, have tendency to the attainment of that end; that all the instructions which he has given to men, from the beginning of the world to this day, by prophets, or apostles, or by his son Jesus Christ; that all his counsels, invitations, promises, threatenings, warnings and expostulations; that all means he has used with men, in ordinances, or providences; yea, all influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no tendency at all to excite any one virtuous act of the mind, or to promote anything morally good and commendable, in any respect (331-32).
N.B. Arminian freedom undermines the inducement of God's commands, because if they motivated one to obey, they would simultaneously destroy freedom thus destroying the virtue of the decision and all subsequent acts.
Next time we will begin tracing Edwards argument through Part Four.
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