- The incarnate Son is fully divine.
- Full divinity includes omniscience.
- Therefore, the incarnate Son is omniscient.
- But the incarnate Son confesses a limited knowledge with respect to the timing of his second coming.
- Therefore, the incarnate Son is not omniscient.
I think the question is this: Is there any sense in which we could say that the incarnate Son is both limited and unlimited in his understanding?
This question is fundamentally related to the doctrine of the incarnation. In the early church one understanding of the incarnation was called Nestorianism. Nestorianism was named after Nestorius (c. 386-c. 451), an early church bishop who may or may not have actually held to the doctrine that bears his name. Nestorians denied the union of the divine and human natures of Christ. They taught that Christ was divine and human but not at the same time. Sometimes he behaved as a human. Other times he behaved as God. This is one way to resolve the problem inherent to the question above, but it is not a Christian way.
Nestorianism was condemned and orthodox Christology was affirmed by the church in the Chalcedonian Definition (451 A.D.) which reads:
Therefore, following the holy fathers, we all with one accord teach men to acknowledge one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once complete in Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man, consisting also of a reasonable soul and body; of one substance with the Father as regards his Godhead, and at the same time of one substance with us as regards his manhood; like us in all respects, apart from sin; as regards his Godhead, begotten of the Father before the ages, but yet as regards his manhood begotten, for us men and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin, the God-bearer; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, recognized in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ; even as the prophets from earliest times spoke of him, and our Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us, and the creed of the fathers has handed down to us.
The eternal Son of God became human in the incarnation. As the God-man, Jesus was fully divine and fully human. Both natures were united in one person "without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ."
If Jesus was fully human, then he had a human understanding. And human understanding is, by definition, limited. Therefore, the incarnate Son could confess limited knowledge at any time truthfully. Nonetheless, he could also confess omniscience at any time truthfully, since his divine understanding is unlimited. This avoids Nestorianism by maintaining a simultaneity of human and divine attributes throughout. The God-man Jesus was simultaneously limited and unlimited in understanding. He was limited in understanding with respect to his humanity, and unlimited in understanding with respect to his deity.
When Jesus told his disciples he did not know the precise timing of his second coming, due to his uniqueness (i.e. two natures united in one person), he was not necessarily denying divine omniscience. The omniscient incarnate Son of God can confess a limited understanding with integrity because he is truly human.
13 comments:
The distinction of natures [divine and human] being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ.
Hi Jay. I have to admit that this part of the Chalcedonian Creed has always seemed untenable to me, for the simple reason that it wasn’t merely a divine nature that became incarnate, but rather the Second Person of the Trinity who became incarnate. Moreover, the Creed contradicts itself. For if the “man” Christ Jesus possessed a “reasonable soul and body” as the Creed asserts, then Jesus did not merely possess an impersonal human nature, but was rather a human person distinct from the divine Second Person of the Trinity.
Scripture also seems to teach this. For example, when Jesus said, “My God, My God, why have You forsaken Me?” (Matt. 27:46), since a rift within the eternal immutable Persons of the Trinity is impossible, Jesus must have been speaking here as a human person -- for an impersonal human “nature” cannot speak. Nor would it make much sense to say that the Father could forsake an impersonal human “nature.” And when Scripture asserts that Jesus “bowed His head and gave up His spirit” (Jn. 19:30) on the cross, how could this possibly be referring to an impersonal human “nature?” If Jesus was not a genuine human person distinct from the divine Second Person of the Trinity (Who cannot die), then who died on the cross for our sins?
Roger
Hi Roger,
Let me begin by saying that the church has historically viewed the incarnation of the Son of God as mystery of mysteries. The Chalcedonian Definition is not as much meant to explain the incarnation as it to give us the boundaries of what we must say about it, on the one hand, and cannot say about it on the other. What we must say is that Jesus Christ was one person with two natures. What we cannot say is that the natures are confused, changed, divided, separated, or indistinct from one another.
The tensions you raised between person and nature are there, but I don't think they lead to contradiction. Let me take each in turn.
You wrote: it wasn’t merely a divine nature that became incarnate, but rather the Second Person, of the Trinity who became incarnate.
Chalcedon agrees with you on this point.
You also wrote: Moreover, the Creed contradicts itself. For if the “man” Christ Jesus possessed a “reasonable soul and body” as the Creed asserts, then Jesus did not merely possess an impersonal human nature, but was rather a human person distinct from the divine Second Person of the Trinity.
This would be a contradiction if "soul" was equivalent to "person." Chalcedon views these as dependent but not equivalent entities. In other words, in order to have a soul one must be a person, but the soul itself is not the person. Therefore, that the incarnate Son had a distinct human soul, which was an aspect of his human nature (material and immaterial) only requires that he be a person, which he was.
As an aside, it is interesting that when we speak of these things we automatically affirm the definition whether we mean to or not. For instance you referred to Jesus (singular) as a human person and a divine person. The concept of "person" is the unifying factor that gives the singular "Jesus" meaning. The incarnate Son was the human-divine person, otherwise we would have to speak of the incarnate sons.
You wrote: Scripture also seems to teach this. For example, when Jesus said, “My God, My God, why have You forsaken Me?” (Matt. 27:46), since a rift within the eternal immutable Persons of the Trinity is impossible, Jesus must have been speaking here as a human person -- for an impersonal human “nature” cannot speak.
I think in order to be consistent with Chalcedon we must affirm that Jesus always spoke as a human and divine person. The cross is mysterious. God cannot die, but man can. Therefore, the one person Jesus Christ, the God-man, is able to die and not able to die at the same time. But he is not able to do both in the same sense, which guards us from contradiction.
You wrote: Nor would it make much sense to say that the Father could forsake an impersonal human “nature.” And when Scripture asserts that Jesus “bowed His head and gave up His spirit” (Jn. 19:30) on the cross, how could this possibly be referring to an impersonal human “nature?”
Again, Chalcedon affirms that the God-man, Jesus Christ, is personal. It does not allow for either an impersonal divine or human nature. Both natures require personhood, but they are not equivalent to it.
You wrote: If Jesus was not a genuine human person distinct from the divine Second Person of the Trinity (Who cannot die), then who died on the cross for our sins?
I think their are two aspects to the death that occurred on the cross (both incurred by the one person, the God-man). The first aspect was the Father turning his face of blessing away and cursing the Son. In that moment something unique happened within the trinity. The divine Son who was also human bore the curse of our sin. The second aspect was the Son giving up his spirit. The human Son who was also divine received the wage of death for our sin. But the one person, the God-man, suffered both aspects on our behalf.
These are mysterious things and I am wary of clicking the "submit" button. I take Chalcedonian Christology very seriously. I believe it is Christian orthodoxy. I pray I have not pressed beyond what God has revealed about himself to his church, and I pray my answers are helpful to you Roger.
Jay
Also, I forgot to mention this: You referenced the portion of the translation of the definition I originally posted which reads: "the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person."
This translation is a bit misleading. It is not as if there was no person until the two natures came together to form it. As you say, the eternal Son has always been the second person of the trinity.
A better translation reads:
Following, then, the holy fathers, we unite in teaching all men to confess the one and only Son, our Lord Jesus Christ. This selfsame one is perfect both in deity and in humanness; this selfsame one is also actually God and actually man, with a rational soul {meaning human soul} and a body. He is of the same reality as God as far as his deity is concerned and of the same reality as we ourselves as far as his humanness is concerned; thus like us in all respects, sin only excepted. Before time began he was begotten of the Father, in respect of his deity, and now in these "last days," for us and behalf of our salvation, this selfsame one was born of Mary the virgin, who is God-bearer in respect of his humanness.
We also teach that we apprehend this one and only Christ--Son, Lord, only-begotten--in two natures; and we do this without confusing the two natures, without transmuting one nature into the other, without dividing them into two separate categories, without contrasting them according to area or function. The distinctiveness of each nature is not nullified by the union. Instead, the properties of each nature are conserved and both natures concur in one person and in one reality. They are not divided or cut into two persons, but are together the one and only and only-begotten Word {Logos} of God, the Lord Jesus Christ. Thus have the prophets of old testified; thus the Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us; thus the Symbol of Fathers has handed down to us.
The concurrence of the two natures in one person is a better translation.
Hi Jay,
Thanks for your response. Please bear with me, and I’ll try to explain the difficulties I see with the Chalcedonian Definition a little better. I’m not in any way trying to say that I have this all figured out (or trying to trip you up in your answers), I’m just trying to think through these difficulties and bounce some ideas off you.
You wrote: it wasn’t merely a divine nature that became incarnate, but rather the Second Person, of the Trinity who became incarnate. Chalcedon agrees with you on this point.
Ok, but they later say that the “properties of each nature [divine and human] are conserved and both natures concur in one person.” But if it was the Second Person of the Trinity who became incarnate and not merely a divine nature, then the “one person” would really be the Second Person Himself -- and Jesus would no longer be a true “man” or “human” person.
This would be a contradiction if "soul" was equivalent to "person." Chalcedon views these as dependent but not equivalent entities. In other words, in order to have a soul one must be a person, but the soul itself is not the person.
Ok, if “soul” or “mind” is not equivalent to “person,” then what constitutes personhood? Didn’t Jesus tell the thief on the cross, “today you will be with Me in Paradise” (Lk. 23:43)? If Jesus wasn’t equating this man’s personhood with his immaterial “soul” here, then what did He mean? And when Paul said, “if I live on in the flesh” (Php. 1:22), was he not referring to his immaterial personal “soul?” Of course he was. This is why I said that if Jesus possessed a “reasonable soul and body” as the Creed asserts, then He did not merely possess an impersonal human nature, but was rather a genuine human person distinct from the divine Second Person of the Trinity. If not, then Jesus was not a true “man” or “human” person.
The concept of "person" is the unifying factor that gives the singular "Jesus" meaning. The incarnate Son was the human-divine person, otherwise we would have to speak of the incarnate sons.
But how is it unscriptural to simply say that Jesus Christ was and is both God and man, a divine Person and a human person at the same time. To deny either seems to be the error. There’s clearly a unique “union” between the divinity and humanity of Jesus that we might not be able to fully explain. I’m just not sure how that “union” can be defined as “one person” in light of the biblical evidence.
I think in order to be consistent with Chalcedon we must affirm that Jesus always spoke as a human and divine person.
But how can that be the case if “soul” is not equivalent to “person,” as you stated earlier? How can Jesus speak as a “human” person if His “soul” is not equivalent to His personhood, and the only “person” in the incarnation was the Second Person of the Trinity?
Again, Chalcedon affirms that the God-man, Jesus Christ, is personal. It does not allow for either an impersonal divine or human nature. Both natures require personhood, but they are not equivalent to it.
I don’t understand what you mean here. If the Second Person of the Trinity became incarnate, then that constitutes Jesus’ divine personhood. But if “both natures” require personhood (as you claim above), then what human personhood did Jesus possess? If Jesus’ “soul” was not equivalent to His human personhood, then how was Jesus a true “man” or human “person?”
I wish I had the time to clarify my points a little more, but I need to get some sleep. I worked the graveyard shift and it’s now 1:30 pm -- I’m dog tired! If anything I said is unclear, that’s probably why. Thanks again, and take care.
Roger
I’m reposting this because I’m not sure if it went through when I posted it yesterday. If there’s a reason why you don’t want to post it please let me know. My email is rgmann@kc.rr.com
Thanks
Hi Jay,
Thanks for your response. Please bear with me, and I’ll try to explain the difficulties I see with the Chalcedonian Definition a little better. I’m not in any way trying to say that I have this all figured out (or trying to trip you up in your answers), I’m just trying to think through these difficulties and bounce some ideas off you.
You wrote: it wasn’t merely a divine nature that became incarnate, but rather the Second Person, of the Trinity who became incarnate. Chalcedon agrees with you on this point.
Ok, but they later say that the “properties of each nature [divine and human] are conserved and both natures concur in one person.” But if it was the Second Person of the Trinity who became incarnate and not merely a divine nature, then the “one person” would really be the Second Person Himself -- and Jesus would no longer be a true “man” or “human” person.
This would be a contradiction if "soul" was equivalent to "person." Chalcedon views these as dependent but not equivalent entities. In other words, in order to have a soul one must be a person, but the soul itself is not the person.
Ok, if “soul” or “mind” is not equivalent to “person,” then what constitutes personhood? Didn’t Jesus tell the thief on the cross, “today you will be with Me in Paradise” (Lk. 23:43)? If Jesus wasn’t equating this man’s personhood with his immaterial “soul” here, then what did He mean? And when Paul said, “if I live on in the flesh” (Php. 1:22), was he not referring to his immaterial personal “soul?” Of course he was. This is why I said that if Jesus possessed a “reasonable soul and body” as the Creed asserts, then He did not merely possess an impersonal human nature, but was rather a genuine human person distinct from the divine Second Person of the Trinity. If not, then Jesus was not a true “man” or “human” person.
The concept of "person" is the unifying factor that gives the singular "Jesus" meaning. The incarnate Son was the human-divine person, otherwise we would have to speak of the incarnate sons.
But how is it unscriptural to simply say that Jesus Christ was and is both God and man, a divine Person and a human person at the same time. To deny either seems to be the error. There’s clearly a unique “union” between the divinity and humanity of Jesus that we might not be able to fully explain. I’m just not sure how that “union” can be defined as “one person” in light of the biblical evidence.
I think in order to be consistent with Chalcedon we must affirm that Jesus always spoke as a human and divine person.
But how can that be the case if “soul” is not equivalent to “person,” as you stated earlier? How can Jesus speak as a “human” person if His “soul” is not equivalent to His personhood, and the only “person” in the incarnation was the Second Person of the Trinity?
Again, Chalcedon affirms that the God-man, Jesus Christ, is personal. It does not allow for either an impersonal divine or human nature. Both natures require personhood, but they are not equivalent to it.
I don’t understand what you mean here. If the Second Person of the Trinity became incarnate, then that constitutes Jesus’ divine personhood. But if “both natures” require personhood (as you claim above), then what human personhood did Jesus possess? If Jesus’ “soul” was not equivalent to His human personhood, then how was Jesus a true “man” or human “person?”
I wish I had the time to clarify my points a little more, but I need to get some sleep. I worked the graveyard shift and it’s now 1:30 pm -- I’m dog tired! If anything I said is unclear, that’s probably why. Thanks again, and take care.
Roger
Hi Jay,
I was just reading Robert Reymond’s treatment of the Chalcedonian Definition in his Systematic Theology, and his main point seems to be the same as yours. He writes:
“Jesus was personal, as a man, by virtue of the union of his manness in the person of the Son. In other words, as a person, the Son of God gave personal identity to the human nature which he had assumed without losing or compromising his divine nature. Never for a moment did the man Jesus exist apart from the union of natures in the one divine person, but then this means as well that the man Jesus from the moment of conception was personal by virtue of the union of the human nature in the divine Son.” (Systematic Theology, p. 610, 1998 edition)
Is this essentially the same formulation of the doctrine that you hold, and what you’ve been trying to relate to me?
Roger
Roger,
Yes. This is the Chalcedonian understanding of the person of Jesus Christ.
I apologize for not responding sooner. I spent some time preparing a response today. It is what follows.
Hi Roger,
I apologize for not responding to your post sooner. I've been vacationing with the family this weekend and just got back into the office. That doesn't normally stop me from blogging, but in this case I only had access to a very slow dial-up connection. Vacation was nice, but it's good to be back in the saddle again.
Let me respond to your replies point by point (you're words in italics):
Ok, but they later say that the “properties of each nature [divine and human] are conserved and both natures concur in one person.” But if it was the Second Person of the Trinity who became incarnate and not merely a divine nature, then the “one person” would really be the Second Person Himself -- and Jesus would no longer be a true “man” or “human” person.
I'm tracking with you all the way up to the em dash. From that point forward, I think you have constructed a non-sequitur.
Here's the flow as I'm reading it:
(1) The Chalcedonian Definition teaches that each nature of Christ (the divine and human) concur in one person.
(2) The Second person of the trinity (the eternal Son) became incarnate.
(3) Therefore, Jesus could not be a true human or divine person.
I don't see how (3) follows from (1) and (2).
I think what you may be doing is confusing the idea of concurrence with incarnation. Those terms should be distinguished. The two natures concur in one person after the incarnation of the eternal Son (i.e. after the eternal Son took on a human nature). The second person of the trinity became a man. When that happened he retained the divine nature that was his eternally and took up a human nature which had not been his eternally. Thus the two natures concurred in the one person.
Ok, if “soul” or “mind” is not equivalent to “person,” then what constitutes personhood?
This is an excellent question! What is it that defines personhood? That is a question on which volumes could be written.
Perhaps a way to make it a bit more precise with respect to Chalcedonian Christology would be to ask: How do personhood and nature relate to one another? Is there a hierarchy? If so, which is primary and in what respect is it so?
The soul is an aspect of human nature. It is the immaterial part (The material part is, of course, the body.).
So when we ask about the relationship between soul and person according to Chalcedon, what we are really asking about is the relationship between the concept of nature (of which soul is a part) and the concept of person.
This is the question I addressed in my initial response when I said, "Chalcedon views these [i.e. soul and person] as dependent but not equivalent entities. In other words, in order to have a soul one must be a person, but the soul itself is not the person."
So what is the relationship? According to Chalcedon, personhood and nature are dependent but not equivalent entities. Personhood has priority in the sense that we may speak of someone being a person but NOT being a nature. Instead, we speak of someone (i.e. a person) having a nature. One cannot be a person without having at least one nature, and one cannot have a nature without being a person. Indeed the "one" which is the subject of this last clause assumes personhood as distinct from nature.
Didn’t Jesus tell the thief on the cross, “today you will be with Me in Paradise” (Lk. 23:43)? If Jesus wasn’t equating this man’s personhood with his immaterial “soul” here, then what did He mean?
First, in order to be sensitive to the historical development of Christian doctrine, I think we should remember that it may be a bit unfair to impose the more precise categories of the fifth century onto the first. I don't think any of the passages you quoted are meant to give us a precise understanding of the Chalcedonian Christology and its anthropological derivatives. Nonetheless, Chalcedon must not (and I think does not) contradict the Scripture. So, the question regarding the passages you mentioned should not be "Do these passages teach Chalcedonian Christology?" but "Do these passages necessarily contradict Chalcedon?" With that in mind, let's address each passage in question.
On Lk 23:43: The text says that Jesus recognized that the "person" (i.e. the thief himself) would be with him in paradise, and obviously, he could not be referring to the thief's body. Does this mean that we should equate the soul of the thief to thief himself (i.e. the person). While that could be the meaning of the text (given simply the immediate context), the text does not require that meaning. All that is required is that the soul be concurrent with the person. Chalcedon affirms that the soul is indeed concurrent with the person. Wherever there is a person, there is a soul.
And when Paul said, “if I live on in the flesh” (Php. 1:22), was he not referring to his immaterial personal “soul?” Of course he was.
Again, the text only requires that the soul is concurrent with the person. It does not require equivalence.
But how is it unscriptural to simply say that Jesus Christ was and is both God and man, a divine Person and a human person at the same time. To deny either seems to be the error. There’s clearly a unique “union” between the divinity and humanity of Jesus that we might not be able to fully explain. I’m just not sure how that “union” can be defined as “one person” in light of the biblical evidence.
Christology is difficult-going at points. Here is the fundamental problem with saying that Jesus was two persons: If we hold that Jesus was two persons, when the Scripture refers to Jesus in the singular, we must either (1) say that he was only acting in the capacity of one of the persons or (2) that a unity lies elsewhere which equates to unity of person. If we go with (2) we are left with the same perceived problem of lodging unity in the concept of person. If we go with (1) then we commit the Nestorian heresy. We have a divided, schizophrenic Lord and Savior. Sometimes he's a man; sometimes he's God. Who controls the switch-over from one to another? What happens to the one person when the other is in action? This answer is clearly fraught with inescapable difficulties.
The Bible speaks of Jesus in terms of divinity and in terms of humanity, yet as one person. Therefore, Chalcedon affirms two natures (divine and human) united in one person, the second person of the trinity.
But how can that be the case if “soul” is not equivalent to “person,” as you stated earlier? How can Jesus speak as a “human” person if His “soul” is not equivalent to His personhood, and the only “person” in the incarnation was the Second Person of the Trinity?
Jesus speaks as a human person in the sense that he is a person with a human nature, which includes a human soul.
I don’t understand what you mean here. If the Second Person of the Trinity became incarnate, then that constitutes Jesus’ divine personhood. But if “both natures” require personhood (as you claim above), then what human personhood did Jesus possess?
There was no possession. The human nature of Jesus, from its first moment of existence, only exists in union with the divine nature of the eternal Son (i.e. the second person of the trinity).
Great questions Roger! These are weighty issues that are well worth the effort of careful thinking.
In Christ,
Jay
Hi Jay,
Thanks for getting back to my questions. I’m glad to hear that you had a nice vacation. You wrote:
I'm tracking with you all the way up to the em dash. From that point forward, I think you have constructed a non-sequitur.
I don’t quite see how what I said amounts to a non-sequitur. If the only person in the incarnation is the divine Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity (as Chalcedon affirms), then it necessarily follows that the incarnate Christ is only a divine person; He is not a human person in any sense at all. The “Man” Christ Jesus is merely an impersonal set of finite human qualities or characteristics attached to the divine Second Person.
I think what you may be doing is confusing the idea of concurrence with incarnation. Those terms should be distinguished. The two natures concur in one person after the incarnation of the eternal Son (i.e. after the eternal Son took on a human nature). The second person of the trinity became a man. When that happened he retained the divine nature that was his eternally and took up a human nature which had not been his eternally. Thus the two natures concurred in the one person.
No, I don’t believe I’m confusing the idea of concurrence with incarnation at all. I fully understand that Chalcedon is saying that both the divine and human natures “concur” in one person; but as I pointed out above, if that “one person” is in fact the divine Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, then it necessarily follows that the incarnate Christ is only a divine person who has assumed an impersonal set of finite human qualities or characteristics.
I suppose the logical difficulty I continue to see with this formulation is summed up by Gordon H. Clark:
“The usual theological treatment of the problem [of the Incarnation] is so self-contradictory that nearly any escape looks promising. After stating that Jesus was a man, a ‘true’ man, the theologians continue by arguing that he was not a man at all -- he was only a ‘nature.’ For them the boy in the temple and the assistant carpenter in Nazareth was some set of qualities attaching to the Second Person. But this is impossible for two reasons. First, it attaches contradictory characteristics to a single Person. He is both omnipotent and frail; he is both omnipresent and localized; he is omniscient, but he is ignorant of some things. In the second place, closely related to the first, the characteristics of an ordinary man cannot possibly attach to Deity. The Logos never gets tired or thirsty; the Logos never increases in either stature or wisdom. The Logos is eternal and immutable. How then can these human characteristics possibly be characteristics of God? But by irresponsibly assigning such qualities to God, the theologians contradict their other statement that Jesus was a true man. Even the word ‘true’ betrays the weakness of their position. Let your yea be yea and your nay be nay. The Scripture simply and plainly says, ‘The Man Christ Jesus.’” (The Incarnation, pg. 76-77 -- italics mine)
While I’m sure that you disagree with Clark here, I’d be interested to see how you respond to the contradictions he points out. I’ve thought long and hard about it, and I don’t see a satisfactory resolution to the problem myself.
On Lk. 23:43 and Php. 1:22 you wrote:
All that is required is that the soul be concurrent with the person. Chalcedon affirms that the soul is indeed concurrent with the person. Wherever there is a person, there is a soul…the text only requires that the soul is concurrent with the person. It does not require equivalence.
The problem I see with this is that Scripture itself doesn’t make this distinction between person and soul -- it seems to be wholly contrived by the framers of Chalcedon. I’m not aware of a single verse or passage that distinguishes a man’s personhood from his soul. Instead we read things such as, “And the Lord God…breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul” (Gen. 2:7). Adam became a living soul or person when God breathed the breath of life into his lifeless body. There’s no hint in this verse or any other that I’m aware of that a man’s personhood is distinct from his soul (see also Acts 2:41, 43; Rom. 2:9; Heb. 6:19; 10:39; Jas. 5:20; 1 Pet. 3:20; 2 Pet. 2:14). So, if this is the case, then what Scriptural warrant does Chalcedon have for asserting such a distinction? And if a man’s ego or self-consciousness or personhood is not equivalent to his soul, then what precisely is the function of his soul?
Moreover, if the personhood of Jesus’ “soul” comes solely from the divine Second Person of the Trinity (as Chalcedon requires), then how could Jesus have said such things as, “Now My soul is troubled” (Jn. 12:27)? The immutable and impassible Second Person of the Trinity can no more be “troubled” than He can “thirst” (Jn. 19:28), “hunger” (Matt. 4:2), or be “tempted” (Heb. 4:15; cf. Jas. 1:13). This is the seemingly insoluble problem that’s created by saying that the personhood of Jesus’ “soul” comes solely from the divine Second Person of the Trinity, and that He wasn’t a true human person in any meaningful sense at all.
If we go with (1) then we commit the Nestorian heresy. We have a divided, schizophrenic Lord and Savior. Sometimes he's a man; sometimes he's God. Who controls the switch-over from one to another? What happens to the one person when the other is in action? This answer is clearly fraught with inescapable difficulties.
Honestly, the “inescapable difficulties” seem to apply more to the Chalcedonian formula (as I partially listed above) than saying that Jesus Christ is both God and man, a divine person and a human person. I realize that this is not Chalcedonian orthodoxy, but up to this point I fail to see how it in any way contradicts either Scripture or sound reasoning. And wouldn’t our sovereign Lord Himself control the “switch-over” between the divine and human persons (if that’s an appropriate description), just as He causes and controls the thoughts and actions of all people? How would that create any more of a logical difficulty than His sovereign control over the divine and human natures of Christ in the Chalcedonian formulation?
The Bible speaks of Jesus in terms of divinity and in terms of humanity, yet as one person. Therefore, Chalcedon affirms two natures (divine and human) united in one person, the second person of the trinity.
Isn’t that sort of begging the question? The Bible clearly speaks of Jesus in terms of both divinity and humanity, but where does Scripture speak of Christ as one person? That’s what Chalcedon asserts; but where does Scripture either explicitly or implicitly teach the same thing?
Jesus speaks as a human person in the sense that he is a person with a human nature, which includes a human soul.
Ah, but here’s the rub. Jesus is not a human person “with a human nature, which includes a soul.” According to Chalcedon, He is a divine person who has merely assumed an impersonal set of finite human qualities or characteristics. Therefore, Jesus can only speak as a divine person through an impersonal human nature that He has assumed.
There was no possession. The human nature of Jesus, from its first moment of existence, only exists in union with the divine nature of the eternal Son (i.e. the second person of the trinity).
So Jesus doesn’t have a genuine human ego or self-consciousness or personhood, but He still constitutes a real “man?” I honestly can’t see how that logically follows?
Great questions Roger! These are weighty issues that are well worth the effort of careful thinking.
Well, I suppose I’ll just have to keep thinking these issues through until I see the light! :-) I just don’t quite see it from the Chalcedonian perspective at this point. But I’m willing to admit that I may be wrong (I’ve been wrong plenty of times in the past). I certainly don’t take the orthodox position lightly or reject it outright. I’m simply expressing how I currently see things and the difficulties I’m having with it. Thank you once again for your time and effort in discussing this with me. Take care and God bless!
In Christ,
Roger
Roger,
I don’t quite see how what I said amounts to a non-sequitur. If the only person in the incarnation is the divine Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity (as Chalcedon affirms), then it necessarily follows that the incarnate Christ is only a divine person; He is not a human person in any sense at all.
The non-sequitur comes with the preposistional phrase "in the incarnation." Here's the deduction you have made:
(1) The second person of the trinity was a divine person prior to the incarnation.
(2) Therefore the second person after the incarnation cannot be considered a human person.
This deduction fails to take into consideration what happened at the incarnation. At the incarnation the divine second person became a man without ceasing to be divine. He is now one person with two natures (i.e. the Chalcedonian Definition,). He didn't become a new person. He, the eternal person, took on a new nature.
I fully understand that Chalcedon is saying that both the divine and human natures “concur” in one person; but as I pointed out above, if that “one person” is in fact the divine Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, then it necessarily follows that the incarnate Christ is only a divine person who has assumed an impersonal set of finite human qualities or characteristics.
Even in the triune formula personhood is distinguished from nature. To say that the Son (i.e. the second person of the trinity) is divine is not to say that his divinity is his personhood. If it means that then the Father cannot be divine in the same way the Son is divine since they are different persons.
Perhaps it will help you to think about it this way: Personhood speaks to relationships; nature speaks to the essential characteristics of a particular person. The eternal Son is a person by virtue of his relationship to the Father. Likewise the Father is a person by virtue of his relationship to the Son. They are both divine by virtue of the characteristics they share (i.e. what theologians call the attributes or perfections of God).
Given this distinction between person and nature, we see that the incarnate Son can be the same person he has been eternally even though he has become human. Why? Because he is in the same relationship with the Father that he has been in eternally. At the incarnation, the Son did not possess a different person from himself. He took on a human nature (i.e. the essential characteristics of humanness). Were those characteristics impersonal? In theory we might view them that way. But in reality they never existed outside of his personhood. Why? Because human nature like divine nature is concurrent with personhood, though not equivalent to it. After the incarnation the Son was one person (as he had always been) with two natures (as he had not always been).
The problem I see with this is that Scripture itself doesn’t make this distinction between person and soul -- it seems to be wholly contrived by the framers of Chalcedon. I’m not aware of a single verse or passage that distinguishes a man’s personhood from his soul. Instead we read things such as, “And the Lord God…breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul” (Gen. 2:7). Adam became a living soul or person when God breathed the breath of life into his lifeless body. There’s no hint in this verse or any other that I’m aware of that a man’s personhood is distinct from his soul (see also Acts 2:41, 43; Rom. 2:9; Heb. 6:19; 10:39; Jas. 5:20; 1 Pet. 3:20; 2 Pet. 2:14).
The Scriptures simply aren't as precise as Chalcedon in this regard. Any added precision is an interpretation of the text, even the addition that soul and personhood are equivalent terms. But we have 1500 years of church tradition in which there has been universal agreement on this issue (Excepting of course the small fringe of monophysite churches). That should carry significant weight in our thinking on this issue.
The equation you have derived from Gen. 2:7 (i.e. soul = personhood) is interpretive. The text doesn't say that. The same goes for all the other texts you cited. None equate the concept of soul with personhood. They simply require that the two be concurrent. Concurrence is not the same as equivalence. Also, as I said earlier, words are often used in Scripture in less precise ways than they come to be used later in the history of doctrinal development. Perhaps the Greek word translated "soul" could also be translated "person." That still does not argue against Chalcedon. Their interchangeability need not be due to their equivalence. It could just as well be due to their concurrence.
So, if this is the case, then what Scriptural warrant does Chalcedon have for asserting such a distinction? And if a man’s ego or self-consciousness or personhood is not equivalent to his soul, then what precisely is the function of his soul?
If by Scriptural warrant you mean proof text, then I'm afraid it has none. There is no explicit Scriptural statement on Chalcedonian Christology. But there is no explicit Scriptural statement on divine omnipotence or trinitarianism either. Both doctrines are deductions from the text.
Chalcedonian Christology is the result of hundreds of years of debate in the church. It is important to remember the context in which this doctrine was formulated. It would be irresponsible to simply jump into the Scriptures looking for easy answers to this very very difficult question.
The controversy revolved around this question: How can the divinity be united with humanity? The church was settled on the full divinity of Jesus Christ. Christ is Lord. But it was still grappling with the seeming contradiction of the incarnation. How can God be united with man? Here is the apparent contradiction:
(1) God is Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable.
(2) Man is corporeal, finite, time-bound, and changeable.
(3) Therefore, God cannot be man and man cannot be God.
It is the old law of non-contradiction. A thing cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same sense. How is the problem of non-contradiction resolved?
Well, it could be dismissed altogether. But then we would have an irrational God. That option is unthinkable (literally).
We could also solve the problem by saying that A is non-A but not at the same time. During the Christological controversies a doctrine called Nestorianism used this tactic. Nestorianism taught that Jesus was able to be both God and man because he was never both at the same time. But that leaves you with a schizophrenic Jesus. Who controls when Jesus switches between being God and being man? Where is Jesus the man when Jesus the God is present? Nestorianism is highly problematic.
The Definition of Chalcedon solves the problem by saying that Jesus is both God and man at the same time but not in the same sense. He is fully God by one nature and fully man by another nature. The natures are "without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved." Both natures are united in one person.
This follows from Scripture, since Jesus is presented there as one person who is both divine and human.
Moreover, if the personhood of Jesus’ “soul” comes solely from the divine Second Person of the Trinity (as Chalcedon requires)
Chalcedon does not teach that the personhood of Jesus' soul comes from the Second person. I'm not sure what that means.
Chalcedon teaches that the incarnate Son was one person with two natures.
Honestly, the “inescapable difficulties” seem to apply more to the Chalcedonian formula (as I partially listed above) than saying that Jesus Christ is both God and man, a divine person and a human person. I realize that this is not Chalcedonian orthodoxy, but up to this point I fail to see how it in any way contradicts either Scripture or sound reasoning. And wouldn’t our sovereign Lord Himself control the “switch-over” between the divine and human persons (if that’s an appropriate description), just as He causes and controls the thoughts and actions of all people? How would that create any more of a logical difficulty than His sovereign control over the divine and human natures of Christ in the Chalcedonian formulation?
Who is the sovereign Lord who controls the switch between the divine and human person? If the divine person is activated, where does the human person go? And if "personhood" is equated with "soul" are you saying that there are times when the soul of the Son inhabits the body and other times when the soul of the man inhabits the body? If so, where does the man-soul go while the God-soul is operative? And if having a human body contradicts divinity, in what sense could we say that Christ was fully divine while the God-soul was inhabiting the body?
When the man-soul is activated is the God-soul still aware? If so, in what sense are the man-soul and the God-soul united? In what sense has God become man?
The fundamental problem with Nestorianism is not that it is unreasonable. It is perfectly reasonable, as is Chalcedon. The problem is that it denies the unity of the incarnate Christ. There is no real union to speak of only tandem. And we confess with the historic church: "I believe in God, the Father Almighty, the Creator of heaven and earth, and in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord (from the Apostles' Creed). We do not confess two Son's or two Lord's. We confess one Lord, the only Son.
The Bible clearly speaks of Jesus in terms of both divinity and humanity, but where does Scripture speak of Christ as one person?.
Any time the Scripture speaks of Jesus in the singular, it speaks of him as one person.
Ah, but here’s the rub. Jesus is not a human person “with a human nature, which includes a soul.”
This isn't what I said. I said Jesus is a person with a human nature which includes a soul.
According to Chalcedon, He is a divine person who has merely assumed an impersonal set of finite human qualities or characteristics. Therefore, Jesus can only speak as a divine person through an impersonal human nature that He has assumed.
Again, this is a non-sequitur You have said:
(1) He is a divine person.
(2) He assumed a human nature.
(3) Therefore we cannot speak of him as a human person.
(3) simply does not follow from (1) and (2). It would only follow if we do not distinguish between natures and person. Chalcedon makes that distinction. Therefore, as a Chaledonian I can joyfully affirm that Jesus is a divine and human person. He is one person with two natures.
So Jesus doesn’t have a genuine human ego or self-consciousness or personhood, but He still constitutes a real “man?” I honestly can’t see how that logically follows?
Again, this is a non-sequitur. Jesus does have a genuine human soul. But his soul is not equivalent to his person. It is concurrent with his person. He (the person) is in every way truly man and truly God.
Well, I suppose I’ll just have to keep thinking these issues through until I see the light! :-) I just don’t quite see it from the Chalcedonian perspective at this point. But I’m willing to admit that I may be wrong (I’ve been wrong plenty of times in the past). I certainly don’t take the orthodox position lightly or reject it outright. I’m simply expressing how I currently see things and the difficulties I’m having with it. Thank you once again for your time and effort in discussing this with me. Take care and God bless!
I appreciate your humility. These are not easy issues to think through. It took churchmen much more gifted than you or me hundreds of years to develop them. I am thankful for their work. What a legacy Christ has left his church!
Jay
Hi Jay,
I really want to thank you for the time and effort you put in explaining the Chalcedonian Definition to me. I have to admit that your explanation is very persuasive, and the doctrine makes much more sense to me than it had previously. As I said before, I hadn’t rejected the Chalcedonian Definition at this point; I was merely questioning some things and playing “devil’s advocate” with you…hoping you would be able to clear up some of the difficulties I was having thinking this through. Unlike many people, I’m not able to accept something that I cannot rationally understand. After considering what you have said, I now agree that the Chalcedonian Definition is more faithful to the Biblical material. I think my primary confusion was in “equating” personhood with the soul. Your explanation about “concurrence” of personhood with the soul helped make sense of a number of the difficulties I was having. Very good job! Once again, I extend my thanks to you. Take care, and may God continue to bless you and your ministry.
In Christ,
Roger
Thanks Roger. It is always a pleasure to discuss Christian doctrine with you. I appreciate your humility and tenacity. Many Christians find hard thinking about God to be superfluous. I think it is an essential part of our call to discipleship.
Your tough questions helped me think about Chalcedonian Christology a bit deeper than I had done before. Thanks for the sharpening my friend!
Jay
By the way, Jay, I'd recommend reading Gordon Clark's book, The Incarnation, if you can find the time. It will provide you with some serious “sharpening,” if you know what I mean. I’m sure you won’t agree with a number of his conclusions, but it will definitely challenge you to think through what you believe in greater detail. If you don’t want to buy it, simply email me your postal address, and I’ll mail it out for you to borrow. You can keep it for as long as you need to read it through. No rush. Let me know if you’re interested.
Roger
Thanks for the recommendation Roger. I'll get that from Amazon ASAP.
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