It is my belief that divine omnipotence, divine omnicausality, human free will, and human moral responsibility are fundamental givens of the created order. But how should we understand these doctrines? How do they relate to one another?
Two terms often used to describe their relationship are libertarianism and compatibilism. Libertarianism teaches that divine causation must be limited in order for humans to be morally responsible, so that God is not the ultimate cause of the decisions we make. On the other hand, compatibilism teaches that divine omnicausality and human moral responsibility are compatible.
Given these two options, I find myself in agreement with compatibilism. But is compatibility the best way to understand the relationship? Are the doctrines merely compatible? In my view, the term compatible is a little soft. It seems to communicate something like: "Sure, I affirm both doctrines, and I also affirm that God and his revelation are non-contradictory. Therefore I must say they are at least compatible, though it is beyond me to understand how it could be so."
I would like to propose another term to describe the relationship between divine omnipotence and human free will. I believe human free will and moral responsibility are actually dependent on divine omnipotence and omnicausality. Rather than simple compatibilism, I think a better term is complementarianism. Though I don't disagree with compatibilism in principle, I would rather be more precise in labeling my view.
Definitions
The root of the word omnipotent is the Latin potens. Potens carries a semantic range that includes ability (i.e. potential) and power. Thus some theologians understand the doctrine divine omnipotence as teaching that God is able to do all things, while others have understood it to mean that God is the ultimate controller or power behind all things. While of course there is some overlap between the ideas (i.e. to be able to do anything could imply power and to be all-powerful could imply the ability to do anything), nonetheless they are, I think, rightly distinguished. Omnipotence could be understood in the sense of ability without requiring that God be a cause of all events (e.g. Arminianism). On the other hand, omnipotence could also be understood to require omnicausality (e.g. Calvinism). But who is right? Should we understand divine omnipotence in the sense of ability or power? Ultimately that will depend on how we define the concept of freedom.
Power and Freedom
Libertarian theologians understand divine omnipotence in the sense of ability. God is omnipotent because he is able to do all things. This understanding ultimately betrays a flawed definition of freedom akin to that of the nominalists of late medieval philosophy (i.e. William of Ockham). The nominalists defined freedom as the ability or potential to choose between a multiplicity of options. God is utterly free, and therefore omnipotent, because he can choose between an infinite number of options. But is this a proper definition of freedom?
According to Scripture, freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options. Indeed Jesus warns his disciples saying: “Enter by the narrow gate. For the gate is wide and the way is easy that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many” (Matt. 7:13). Surely an implied aspect of the wideness of the wide gate is the multiplicity of options from which one can choose there, and yet the wide gate is not the way to true freedom. Jesus tells his disciples, “The truth will set you free” (John 8:32b). The word translated "truth" is singular. In other words, there is one truth, one option, that is freeing not multiple options. Paul sums up the biblical teaching (i.e. the gospel) from Genesis forward writing: “But thanks be to God, that you who were once slaves of sin have become obedient from the heart to the standard of teaching to which you were committed, and, having been set free from sin, have become slaves of righteousness” (Rom 6:17-18). The Apostle Paul describes freedom as slavery. Is slavery the proper metaphor to communicate the multiplicity of one's options? Of course not! Slavery communicates just the opposite, a limitation of options. Slavery diminishes one's options to the singular will of the master; yet Paul describes true freedom as slavery to the will of God. These examples clearly contradict the notion that freedom is the ability to choose from a multiplicity of options. As J. Gresham Machen once wrote:
The consistent biblical teaching seems to be this: Freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options—that is tyranny; freedom is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option.
Should we then understand that God is free because he has the ability to choose from an infinite number of options? Or should we understand divine freedom as the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option (i.e. what accords with the perfect divine character)? I think the latter is preferable. In other words, the freedom of God is the consistency of God’s prevailing inclination to never deny (or contradict) himself. To state it positively, the freedom of God is the consistency of God’s prevailing inclination to always accomplish his purposes. And God is powerful in the sense that his inclination can never be frustrated. His power is the unassailableness of his intended purpose. In all things, he accomplishes (i.e. power) exactly what he purposes (i.e. causes); thus divine omnipotence presumes divine omnicausality. The doctrine of divine omnipotence is not a matter of potentiality; it is a matter of actuality. It is not a matter of neutrality but inclinational consistency. The question is not, strictly speaking, what could God do? It is what would God do or, even better, what has God done? Keeping this in mind . . .
Causation and Responsibility
This is no proof of the doctrines of divine omnipotence and divine omnicausality nor should it be. It is simply a description of them. Proving the doctrines would undermine my assertion that they are fundamental givens. We must begin with these concepts. In other words, we all acknowledge that some power must be behind all created things. The creation, by definition, is not self-existent. We also all acknowledge that effects, by definition, have causes. In other words, the creation is not self-generating.
The question then becomes, who is responsible for causing these effects? Since the effects include evil, some systems, assuming only one sense of causal responsibility, opt for dualism when answering this question. That is what my post on The Arminian Demiurge was about. But the question, Who is responsible for causing these effects? begs an even more fundamental question: What is responsibility?
Libertarianism teaches that the concept of responsibility must carry only one causal sense, namely, primacy. In order for an agent, whether human or divine, to be responsible for his action he must be the primary (or initiating) cause of that action. There can be no cause of the action prior to the agent himself.
This of course presumes that morally responsible causation occurs from a vantage point of ultimate neutrality. When presented with a moral decision, in order to choose as a prime cause, the agent must have no prior inclination to choose any particular option. In other words, any prior inclination or bias is viewed as undermining causal primacy, because the inclination itself becomes primary. Thus if the agent isn't ultimately neutral, he is not the primary cause of the action, his choice was not really free, and responsibility is vitiated. Neutrality is the first principle of libertarian ethics.
It is not difficult to see how the supposed ideal of neutrality comports with the flawed definition of freedom. If freedom is the ability to choose from a multiplicity of options, ability presupposes neutrality. At this point my approach diverges from libertarianism at a most fundamental level.
I do not believe neutrality is either achievable or desirable for created or non-created willing. True freedom is not founded upon neutrality; it is founded upon inclination. It is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option. This definition of freedom also applies to God who is perfectly inclined toward knowing, valuing, and doing according his own holy character.
Given this definition of freedom, I am free to posit more than one sense of causation with respect to moral responsibility in order to account for the existence of evil in the creation without giving up divine omnicausality. There is a sense in which God is the primary cause of all things (i.e. omnicausality), including the moral decisions of his image bearers. But there is also a secondary sense in which human beings are properly considered causes of all their actions, and herein lies human moral responsibility.
As secondary causes, we are responsible for our actions because our decision to act is based on our prevailing inclination. In other words, ultimately we always and only do what we want. If our inclination is, by God’s foreordination, in accord with his moral law, then the act is right and good. If it is, by God’s foreordination, out of accord with his moral law, then it is sin. Again, in both cases responsibility hinges on prevailing inclination. That God is the primary cause of what we do in no way interferes with the fact that we do whatever we want and, therefore, does not nullify our responsibility.
And this in NO way impugns the character of God. If God has ordained that we have sinful inclinations at one moment in time so that we necessarily sin, he is not thereby liable for sinning himself. Why? Because God is not motivated by a sinful inclination in ordaining the sinful inclinations of his creatures. He is motivated by perfectly pure, holy, and righteous inclinations. God always and only does what he wants, and what he wants is always in accord with his righteous character. While the sinful inclination in the creature is no doubt evil in itself, its existence within larger redemptive history is not evil when viewed from God's perspective. God is able to be the primary cause of all things (i.e. omnicausality), even the sinful decisions of his moral creatures, without violating either his righteous character or our moral responsibility.
In fact apart from divine causation we could not be responsible since he is the ultimate cause of all our inclinations, whether by positively acting upon our hearts so that we are inclined toward him (i.e. the good) or by leaving us to inclinations directed against him and toward something else (i.e. the bad). In this way we see how divine omnicausality and human responsibility are not just compatible but complementary.
The same goes for divine omnipotence and human freedom. Freedom is the consistency of inclination to choose the right option. Because that consistency is ultimately maintained by the power of God at work in our lives, freedom is dependent on divine omnipotence. In other words, we are slaves by nature. Freedom is slavery to righteousness. What we need is to be submitted to a good master so that he directs our every move. That is true freedom.
Summary
What I have tied to say above is basically this:
True freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options—that is tyranny; it is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option.
The above definition seeks to explain the relationship between the doctrines of divine omnipotence, divine omnicausality, human free will, and human moral responsibility by moving beyond what has traditionally been called compatibilism to complementarianism. I also intend to demonstrate the difference between the libertarian, compatibilist, and complementarian understandings with regard to the same doctrines. Here is a breakdown of key relationships within each system:
Two terms often used to describe their relationship are libertarianism and compatibilism. Libertarianism teaches that divine causation must be limited in order for humans to be morally responsible, so that God is not the ultimate cause of the decisions we make. On the other hand, compatibilism teaches that divine omnicausality and human moral responsibility are compatible.
Given these two options, I find myself in agreement with compatibilism. But is compatibility the best way to understand the relationship? Are the doctrines merely compatible? In my view, the term compatible is a little soft. It seems to communicate something like: "Sure, I affirm both doctrines, and I also affirm that God and his revelation are non-contradictory. Therefore I must say they are at least compatible, though it is beyond me to understand how it could be so."
I would like to propose another term to describe the relationship between divine omnipotence and human free will. I believe human free will and moral responsibility are actually dependent on divine omnipotence and omnicausality. Rather than simple compatibilism, I think a better term is complementarianism. Though I don't disagree with compatibilism in principle, I would rather be more precise in labeling my view.
Definitions
The root of the word omnipotent is the Latin potens. Potens carries a semantic range that includes ability (i.e. potential) and power. Thus some theologians understand the doctrine divine omnipotence as teaching that God is able to do all things, while others have understood it to mean that God is the ultimate controller or power behind all things. While of course there is some overlap between the ideas (i.e. to be able to do anything could imply power and to be all-powerful could imply the ability to do anything), nonetheless they are, I think, rightly distinguished. Omnipotence could be understood in the sense of ability without requiring that God be a cause of all events (e.g. Arminianism). On the other hand, omnipotence could also be understood to require omnicausality (e.g. Calvinism). But who is right? Should we understand divine omnipotence in the sense of ability or power? Ultimately that will depend on how we define the concept of freedom.
Power and Freedom
Libertarian theologians understand divine omnipotence in the sense of ability. God is omnipotent because he is able to do all things. This understanding ultimately betrays a flawed definition of freedom akin to that of the nominalists of late medieval philosophy (i.e. William of Ockham). The nominalists defined freedom as the ability or potential to choose between a multiplicity of options. God is utterly free, and therefore omnipotent, because he can choose between an infinite number of options. But is this a proper definition of freedom?
According to Scripture, freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options. Indeed Jesus warns his disciples saying: “Enter by the narrow gate. For the gate is wide and the way is easy that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many” (Matt. 7:13). Surely an implied aspect of the wideness of the wide gate is the multiplicity of options from which one can choose there, and yet the wide gate is not the way to true freedom. Jesus tells his disciples, “The truth will set you free” (John 8:32b). The word translated "truth" is singular. In other words, there is one truth, one option, that is freeing not multiple options. Paul sums up the biblical teaching (i.e. the gospel) from Genesis forward writing: “But thanks be to God, that you who were once slaves of sin have become obedient from the heart to the standard of teaching to which you were committed, and, having been set free from sin, have become slaves of righteousness” (Rom 6:17-18). The Apostle Paul describes freedom as slavery. Is slavery the proper metaphor to communicate the multiplicity of one's options? Of course not! Slavery communicates just the opposite, a limitation of options. Slavery diminishes one's options to the singular will of the master; yet Paul describes true freedom as slavery to the will of God. These examples clearly contradict the notion that freedom is the ability to choose from a multiplicity of options. As J. Gresham Machen once wrote:
Dependence upon a word of man would be slavish, but dependence upon God's word is life. Dark and gloomy would be the world, if we were left to our own devices, and had no blessed Word of God. The Bible, to the Christian, is not a burdensome law, but the very Magna Charta of Christian liberty" (Christianity and Liberalism, 78-79).
The consistent biblical teaching seems to be this: Freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options—that is tyranny; freedom is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option.
Should we then understand that God is free because he has the ability to choose from an infinite number of options? Or should we understand divine freedom as the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option (i.e. what accords with the perfect divine character)? I think the latter is preferable. In other words, the freedom of God is the consistency of God’s prevailing inclination to never deny (or contradict) himself. To state it positively, the freedom of God is the consistency of God’s prevailing inclination to always accomplish his purposes. And God is powerful in the sense that his inclination can never be frustrated. His power is the unassailableness of his intended purpose. In all things, he accomplishes (i.e. power) exactly what he purposes (i.e. causes); thus divine omnipotence presumes divine omnicausality. The doctrine of divine omnipotence is not a matter of potentiality; it is a matter of actuality. It is not a matter of neutrality but inclinational consistency. The question is not, strictly speaking, what could God do? It is what would God do or, even better, what has God done? Keeping this in mind . . .
Causation and Responsibility
This is no proof of the doctrines of divine omnipotence and divine omnicausality nor should it be. It is simply a description of them. Proving the doctrines would undermine my assertion that they are fundamental givens. We must begin with these concepts. In other words, we all acknowledge that some power must be behind all created things. The creation, by definition, is not self-existent. We also all acknowledge that effects, by definition, have causes. In other words, the creation is not self-generating.
The question then becomes, who is responsible for causing these effects? Since the effects include evil, some systems, assuming only one sense of causal responsibility, opt for dualism when answering this question. That is what my post on The Arminian Demiurge was about. But the question, Who is responsible for causing these effects? begs an even more fundamental question: What is responsibility?
Libertarianism teaches that the concept of responsibility must carry only one causal sense, namely, primacy. In order for an agent, whether human or divine, to be responsible for his action he must be the primary (or initiating) cause of that action. There can be no cause of the action prior to the agent himself.
This of course presumes that morally responsible causation occurs from a vantage point of ultimate neutrality. When presented with a moral decision, in order to choose as a prime cause, the agent must have no prior inclination to choose any particular option. In other words, any prior inclination or bias is viewed as undermining causal primacy, because the inclination itself becomes primary. Thus if the agent isn't ultimately neutral, he is not the primary cause of the action, his choice was not really free, and responsibility is vitiated. Neutrality is the first principle of libertarian ethics.
It is not difficult to see how the supposed ideal of neutrality comports with the flawed definition of freedom. If freedom is the ability to choose from a multiplicity of options, ability presupposes neutrality. At this point my approach diverges from libertarianism at a most fundamental level.
I do not believe neutrality is either achievable or desirable for created or non-created willing. True freedom is not founded upon neutrality; it is founded upon inclination. It is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option. This definition of freedom also applies to God who is perfectly inclined toward knowing, valuing, and doing according his own holy character.
Given this definition of freedom, I am free to posit more than one sense of causation with respect to moral responsibility in order to account for the existence of evil in the creation without giving up divine omnicausality. There is a sense in which God is the primary cause of all things (i.e. omnicausality), including the moral decisions of his image bearers. But there is also a secondary sense in which human beings are properly considered causes of all their actions, and herein lies human moral responsibility.
As secondary causes, we are responsible for our actions because our decision to act is based on our prevailing inclination. In other words, ultimately we always and only do what we want. If our inclination is, by God’s foreordination, in accord with his moral law, then the act is right and good. If it is, by God’s foreordination, out of accord with his moral law, then it is sin. Again, in both cases responsibility hinges on prevailing inclination. That God is the primary cause of what we do in no way interferes with the fact that we do whatever we want and, therefore, does not nullify our responsibility.
And this in NO way impugns the character of God. If God has ordained that we have sinful inclinations at one moment in time so that we necessarily sin, he is not thereby liable for sinning himself. Why? Because God is not motivated by a sinful inclination in ordaining the sinful inclinations of his creatures. He is motivated by perfectly pure, holy, and righteous inclinations. God always and only does what he wants, and what he wants is always in accord with his righteous character. While the sinful inclination in the creature is no doubt evil in itself, its existence within larger redemptive history is not evil when viewed from God's perspective. God is able to be the primary cause of all things (i.e. omnicausality), even the sinful decisions of his moral creatures, without violating either his righteous character or our moral responsibility.
In fact apart from divine causation we could not be responsible since he is the ultimate cause of all our inclinations, whether by positively acting upon our hearts so that we are inclined toward him (i.e. the good) or by leaving us to inclinations directed against him and toward something else (i.e. the bad). In this way we see how divine omnicausality and human responsibility are not just compatible but complementary.
The same goes for divine omnipotence and human freedom. Freedom is the consistency of inclination to choose the right option. Because that consistency is ultimately maintained by the power of God at work in our lives, freedom is dependent on divine omnipotence. In other words, we are slaves by nature. Freedom is slavery to righteousness. What we need is to be submitted to a good master so that he directs our every move. That is true freedom.
Summary
What I have tied to say above is basically this:
True freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options—that is tyranny; it is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option.
The above definition seeks to explain the relationship between the doctrines of divine omnipotence, divine omnicausality, human free will, and human moral responsibility by moving beyond what has traditionally been called compatibilism to complementarianism. I also intend to demonstrate the difference between the libertarian, compatibilist, and complementarian understandings with regard to the same doctrines. Here is a breakdown of key relationships within each system:
Key:
= equals
=> allows
<=> necessitates
Libertarianism
= equals
=> allows
<=> necessitates
Libertarianism
- Human moral responsibility <=> Human free will
- Human free will <=> Limited divine causality
- Limited divine causality => Divine all-ability
- Divine all-ability = Divine omnipotence
Compatibilism
- Human moral responsibility <=> Human free will
- Human free will => Divine omnicausality
- Divine omnicausality <=> Divine all-power
- Divine all-power = Divine omnipotence
Complementarianism
- Human moral responsibility <=> Human free will
- Human free will <=> Divine omnicausality
- Divine omnicausality <=> Divine all-power
- Divine all-power = Divine omnipotence
The chief difference is seen across all three spectra at point 2. For libertarianism, human free will necessitates limited divine causality. For compatibilism, human free will allows divine omnicausality. For complementarianism, human free will necessitates divine omnicausality.
Conclusion
Given these relationships, my primary complaint against compatibilism is that it doesn't explicitly integrate a definition of freedom with respect to human free will. It simply affirms the compatibility (i.e. an allowance) between human freedom and divine omnicausality without defining what freedom actually is. That is a significant weakness.
Libertarianism and complementarianism, on the other hand, are more explicitly integrative accounts of divine-human relations. What distinguishes them from one another is their respective definitions of freedom. Libertarianism teaches that freedom is the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options. Complementarianism teaches that freedom is the consistency of inclination to choose the right option.
Complementarianism is not at odds with compatibilism; it is just more precise. That is why I am not a compatibilist. I am a complementarian.
[The essence of the above thinking is not unique though my expression of it may be. Most of my thinking on this subject comes from Jonathan Edwards's work Freedom of the Will.]
Conclusion
Given these relationships, my primary complaint against compatibilism is that it doesn't explicitly integrate a definition of freedom with respect to human free will. It simply affirms the compatibility (i.e. an allowance) between human freedom and divine omnicausality without defining what freedom actually is. That is a significant weakness.
Libertarianism and complementarianism, on the other hand, are more explicitly integrative accounts of divine-human relations. What distinguishes them from one another is their respective definitions of freedom. Libertarianism teaches that freedom is the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options. Complementarianism teaches that freedom is the consistency of inclination to choose the right option.
Complementarianism is not at odds with compatibilism; it is just more precise. That is why I am not a compatibilist. I am a complementarian.
[The essence of the above thinking is not unique though my expression of it may be. Most of my thinking on this subject comes from Jonathan Edwards's work Freedom of the Will.]
1 comments:
Jay the Bennett wrote:
"The consistent biblical teaching seems to be this: Freedom is not the ability to choose between a multiplicity of options—that is tyranny; freedom is the consistency of a prevailing inclination to choose the right option."
Friends, if you get nothing else, get this.
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