FRIDAY EDWARDS QUOTE: Is it contemnible for God to do his works for the praise of men?

In his dissertation The End for Which God Created the World Jonathan Edwards develops the thesis that God is his own end in all he does. In Chapter 1 Section 4 he anticipates and answers four objections: (1) that it violates the doctrine of divine aseity, (2) that it paints God as selfish, (3) that it is contemnible for God to do things for the praise of men, and (4) that it undermines the obligation of creaturely gratitude. Recently, New Testament professor Ben Witherington mounted objection 3 in response to Tom Schreiner's new book on New Testament Theology. You can read more about that discussion here. Edwards answer's objection 3 writing:

OBJECT. III. To what has been supposed, that God makes himself his end—in seeking that his glory and excellent perfections should be known, esteemed, loved, and delighted in by his creatures—it may be objected, that this seems unworthy of God. It is considered as below a truly great man, to be much influenced in his conduct by a desire of popular applause. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude, would be esteemed but a low end, to be aimed at by a prince or philosopher, in any great and noble enterprise. How much more is it unworthy the great God, to perform his magnificent works, e. g. the creation of the vast universe, out of regard to the notice and admiration of worms of the dust, that the displays of his magnificence may be gazed at, and applauded by those who are infinitely more beneath him, than the meanest rabble are beneath the greatest prince or philosopher.

This objection is specious. It hath a show of argument; but it will appear to be nothing but a show, if we consider,

1. Whether it be not worthy of God, to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itself; and so to take pleasure in its existence.

It seems not liable to any doubt, that there could be no future existence worthy to be desired or sought by God, and so worthy to be made his end, if no future existence was valuable and worthy to be brought to effect. If, when the world was not, there was any possible future thing fit and valuable in itself, I think the knowledge of God’s glory, and the esteem and love of it, must be so. Understanding and will are the highest kind of created existence. And if they be valuable, it must be in their exercise. But the highest and most excellent kind of their exercise is in some actual knowledge, and exercise of will. And, certainly, the most excellent actual knowledge and will that can be in the creature, is the knowledge and the love of God. And the most true excellent knowledge of God, is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence; and the most excellent exercise of the will consists in esteem and love, and a delight in his glory.—If any created existence is in itself worthy to be, or any thing that ever was future is worthy of existence, such a communication of divine fullness, such an emaciation and expression of the divine glory, is worthy of existence. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exist, then no future thing was, worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world. And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creation, then nothing was worthy to be God’s end in creation.

If God’s own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and esteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded by him: for this is a necessary consequence. To make this plain let it be considered, how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion, we shall approve of others’ esteem of them; and shall disapprove the contempt of them. If these virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that we should thus approve others’ esteem, and disapprove their contempt of them. And the case is the same with respect to any being’s own qualities or attributes. If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, and dislike their disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteemed by the being who hath them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionately approved and regarded. I desire it may he considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeased with contempt of himself? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love, esteem, and honor of himself.

The matter may be also cleared, by considering what it would become us to approve of and value with respect to any public society we belong to, e. g. our nation or country. It becomes us to love our country; and therefore it becomes us to value the just honor of our country. But the same that it becomes us to value and desire for a friend, and the same that it becomes us to desire and seek for the community, the same does it become God to value and seek for himself; that is, on supposition, that it becomes God to love himself as it does men to love a friend or the public; which I think has been before proved.

Here are two things that ought particularly to be adverted to. (1.) That in God, the love of himself and the love of the public are not to be distinguished, as in man: because God’s being, as it were, comprehends all. His existence, being infinite, must be equivalent to universal existence. And for the same reason that public affection in the creature is fit and beautiful, God’s regard to himself must be so likewise.—(2.) In God, the love of what is fit and decent, cannot he a distinct thing from the love of himself; because the love of God is that wherein all holiness primarily and chiefly consists, and God’s own holiness must primarily consist in the love of himself. And if God’s holiness consists in love to himself, then it will imply an approbation of the esteem and love of him in others. For a being that loves himself, necessarily loves love to himself. If holiness in God consist chiefly in love to himself, holiness in the creature must chiefly consist in love to him. And if God loves holiness in himself, he must love it in the creature.

Virtue, by such of the late philosophers as seem to be in chief repute, is placed in public affection, or general benevolence. And if the essence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue itself is virtuous no otherwise, than as it is implied in, or arises from, this public affection, or extensive benevolence of mind. Because if a man truly loves the public, he necessarily loves love to the public.

Now therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevolence in the highest sense, be the same thing with benevolence to the Divine Being, who is in effect universal Being, it will follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise virtuous, than as it is implied in, or arises from, love to the Divine Being. Consequently, God’s own love to virtue is implied in love to himself: and is virtuous no otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God’s virtuous disposition, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into the same thing with love to himself. And consequently, whereinsoever he makes virtue his end, he makes himself his end. In fine, God being as it were an all-comprehending Being, all his moral perfections—his holiness, justice, grace, and benevolence—are some way or other to be resolved intoa supreme and infinite regard to himself; and if so, it will be easy to suppose that it becomes him to make himself his supreme and last end in his works.

I would here observe, by the way, that if any insist that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a manner as not to love it from regard to himself; this will contradict a former objection against God taking pleasure in communications of himself; viz. that inasmuch as God is perfectly independent and self-sufficient, therefore all his happiness and pleasure consists in the enjoyment of himself. So that if the same persons make both objections, they must be inconsistent with themselves.

2. I would observe, that it is not unworthy of God to take pleasure in that which is in itself fit and amiable, even in those that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and condescension in it, yet these are not unworthy of God, but infinitely to his honor and glory.

They who insist, that God’s own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the world; but the happiness of his creatures: do it under a color of exalting God’s benevolence to his creatures. But if his love to them be so great, and he so highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works, as they suppose; they are not consistent with themselves, in supposing that God has so little value for their love and esteem. For as the nature of love, especially great love, causes him that loves to value the esteem of the person beloved, so, that God should take pleasure in the creature’s just love and esteem, will follow from God’s love both to himself and to his creatures. If he esteem and love himself, he must approve of esteem and love to himself, and disapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he must value and take delight in their mutual love and esteem.

3. As to what is alleged, that it is unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct and achievements by a regard to the applause of the populace; I would observe, What makes their applause worthy of so little regard, is their ignorance, giddiness, and injustice. The applause of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any just view of things, but on humor, mistake, folly, and unreasonable affections. Such applause deserves to be disregarded.—But it is not beneath a man of great dignity and wisdom, to value the wise and just esteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of greatness of mind, would show a haughty and mean spirit. It is such an esteem in his creatures, that God regards; for, such an esteem only is fit and amiable in itself.

BOOK REVIEW: The Federal Theology of Thomas Boston

I recently finished a book by historical theologian and Scottish Puritanism scholar A. T. B. McGowan entitled The Federal Theology of Thomas Boston. It is a monograph in the Rutherford Studies in Historical Theology. I read Boston's classic biblical anthropology Human Nature in Its Fourfold State this summer, which can be accessed online here, and wanted to learn more about Boston's times and theology. I have written a brief biographical sketch of Boston here.

Dr. McGowan begins with Boston's doctrine of the covenants, Christology, and the atonement. He finishes with Boston on the ordo salutis, covering predestination, regeneration, justification, sanctification, repentance, and assurance.

Boston fits squarely into the covenant theology of the Westminster Confession, holding to the basic two covenant system. His Christology is orthodox down the line. At the incarnation, the Son of God assumed weakened but sinless humanity while remaining fully divine. The Christ's holy nature is essential for his atoning work, and the imputation of his holiness is essential for our justification. Boston held to the understanding of Christ's work as both active and passive obedience. He viewed the atonement as a trinitarian act that actually secured the redemption of God's elect. Particularly enlightening to me was McGowan's discussion of the Marrow Controversy, an event to which he frequently returns, as well as the related Atonement Controversy.

McGowan includes a substantial section on the historical development of predestinarianism from Augustine to Calvin to Knox, demonstrating that Boston is in their line of thought. He is also in agreement with the Westminster Confession's understanding that regeneration is equivalent to effectual calling. Upon regeneration, one is united with Christ and justified. There seemed to be some confusion over whether Boston believed union with Christ logically preceded justification or vice versa. For instance, at one point McGowan writes: "The first fruit of justification is union with Christ," which orders justification as prior to union (p. 107). But later, after quoting Boston as saying justification is a benefit of our union with Christ, he writes: "Notice in passing what we shall return to when we consider the meaning and significance of imputation, namely, that we are not righteous because we are justified, rather we are justified because we are already considered to be righteous through our union with Christ and our participation in his righteousness," thus ordering union with Christ as prior to justification. The charge of antinomianism had been leveled at Boston during the Marrow Controversy. But Dr. McGowan conclusively demonstrates that Boston was no antinomian. Boston represents the Reformed/Westminsterian tradition faithfully.

Overall, I was very pleased with Dr. McGowan's book. It provides a wonderful entrance into the life and thought of a great puritan divine. It is a fine example of historical theology done well. I highly recommend it to anyone wanting to gain a better understanding of the theology of Thomas Boston and late Scottish Puritanism.

CRITIQUING BEN WITHERINGTON'S COMMENTS AGAINST GOD BEING HIS OWN END IN ALL HE DOES (pt. 3)

Continued from part 2 . . .

Dr. Witherington writes:

Another text worth thinking about is of course 'Christ in you, the hope of glory'. Here clearly the reference is to human beings obtaining glory in the future. God doesn't hope for glory, God is simply glorious. Here again we find the Pauline notion of the glorification of human beings at the eschaton, of which Christ's living presence in us gives a foretaste and thus produces hope for such a consummation.

See part 2 for a critique of Witherington's thought on this point. Fundamentally, that God is ultimately concerned with his own glory does not preclude the glorification of his creation. Therefore, Witherington's point here is moot.

Moving on . . .

One commenter named Owen asked about Ephesians 1. The text says that all of our salvation has been done "to the praise of the glory of his grace."

Dr. Witherington responded:

Ephesians 1 does not say that everything that is created or everything that is redeemed is done FOR God's glory. The phrase doing something 'to the glory of God' has a very specific meaning in ANE culture namely that it is done in a way that comports with God's character, brings honor to God's name. This is very different from Owen's notions about Ephes. 1. It's one thing to say that God acts with integrity and in a manner that is consistent with his character and should lead humans to praise God, it is another thing to say that God's motive for doing such things is applause, or so that he could have more glory.

Whether the text says "to" or "for" is, I think, quite beside the point. Either way, Paul returns to the concept of divine purpose twice in the pericope. Both times we also find the phrase in question. Let's look at the text (Eph. 1:3-14):

3 Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places,
4 even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him. In love
5 he predestined us for adoption through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will,
6 to the praise of his glorious grace, with which he has blessed us in the Beloved.
7 In him we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of his grace,
8 which he lavished upon us, in all wisdom and insight
9 making known to us the mystery of his will, according to his purpose, which he set forth in Christ
10 as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth.
11 In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will,
12 so that we who were the first to hope in Christ might be to the praise of his glory.
13 In him you also, when you heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation, and believed in him, were sealed with the promised Holy Spirit,
14 who is the guarantee of our inheritance until we acquire possession of it, to the praise of his glory.

Paul clearly teaches that our redemption in Christ from predestination to consummation is according to the purpose of God. Witherington seems to be suggesting, based of Paul's use of the preposition "to" rather than "for," that our redemption is according to the purpose of God and to the praise of his glory but NOT according to the purpose of God which includes the praise of his glory as a divine motivation. As he says, the praise of God's glory is just a "by product" of our redemption. He writes, "It's one thing to say that God acts with integrity and in a manner that is consistent with his character and should lead humans to praise God, it is another thing to say that God's motive for doing such things is applause, or so that he could have more glory."

It seems that either Witherington does not want to include the praise of God's glory in the divine purpose at all, or he envisions it as a part of the divine purpose but a part in which God is fundamentally disinterested. In other words, Witherington is either limiting the scope of God's purpose or employing a faulty concept of decision making (i.e. purposing). I would offer two points of criticism.

First, if Witherington intends to limit the divine purpose, I would point the reader to the fact that the divine purpose in question is eternal (cf. Eph 3:11). And since the divine purpose to which Paul is referring is the eternal purpose, also known as the eternal decree, and God is omniscient, then it must be universal by definition. There can be no part of the unfolding redemptive history which was not included in the divine purpose. As Paul says, God "works all things according to the counsel of his will" (Eph. 1:11b). That must include the concept of God's glory being praised.

Second, if Witherington includes the praise of God's glory in the divine purpose but intends to present God as disinterested in whether he receives praise or not, I would point the reader to the excellent philosophical-theological argument mounted by Jonathan Edwards in The Freedom of the Will. Edwards demonstrates in 1.2 and 2.7 that the idea of a neutral disposition in decision-making (i.e. purposing), is nonsensical. As he demonstrates in 3.6 and 3.7, this is especially true with regard to moral decision-making.

Decision requires disposition. If God decided prior to creation that he would be praised, he could not have been neutral. He must have been disposed toward being praised. In other words, he must have been motivated by the desire to receive praise. And since the praise of God's glory is clearly a morally good concept (e.g. to not praise God is sin), then disposition becomes paramount. To the degree that one is not fully disposed to seek and participate in the praise of God's glory, he is in sin. Therefore, God must be infinitely disposed to seek his own glory in all he does, which is a throughly biblical concept. If the praise of God's glory is just a "by product" of God's actions, something to which he is fundamentally disinterested, then God is a sinner and worthy of no praise. For more on that idea see Edwards's excellent treatise on The End for Which God Created the World, particularly 1.3.

Witherington concludes his comment on Eph. 1 using a questionable phrase to describe the Reformed-Edwardsian idea of God being his own end in all he does. He speaks of God being motivated to get "more glory." It should be noted that the idea of God getting more glory is not conceived as a quantitative or qualitative increase of the divine being by Edwards, Piper, or Schreiner. What is conceived is that God's glory is displayed in the creation. Piper also uses the concept of magnification, which might be problematic if interpreted as God receiving some qualitative or quantitative increase of glory. But Piper is quick to point out that he is using the term magnify in the sense that a telescope magnifies the image of a distant star rather than the sense of a microscope magnifying something that is too small to see. Microscopic magnification is obviously problematic since it speaks to the size of the observed itself (i.e. making something that is small in itself appear to be larger). Telescopic magnification, on the other hand, only speaks to the relationship between the observer and the observed not to the size of the observed itself.

To the extent that the beauty of God is displayed and magnified in his creation, God is glorified in his creation. And since God has been redeeming his fallen creation throughout history, a history which includes both stagnations and revivals of true religion, then it is appropriate to speak of God as being more glorified in certain historical circumstances than in others. But historical circumstance should never be understood as qualitatively or quantitatively adding to the glory of the divine being himself.

In conclusion notice the the preposition "for" in the following passage from Isaiah 48:9-11. God says through his prophet:

For my name's sake I defer my anger,
for the sake of my praise I restrain it for you,
that I may not cut you off.

Behold, I have refined you, but not as silver;
I have tried you in the furnace of affliction.

For my own sake, for my own sake, I do it,
for how should my name be profaned?
My glory I will not give to another.

FRIDAY EDWARDS QUOTE: Was Edwards infra- or supralapsarian in his ordering of the divine decree?

Yesterday Tony Reinke posted an article at The Shepherds Scrapbook on Jonathan Edwards's ordering of the decrees, which was a significant portion of my masters thesis at Dallas Theological Seminary. Reinke offered John Gerstner's perspective from his three-volume work, The Rational and Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, as a possible answer to the question. I commented in order to offer an alternative view from Oliver Crisp's more recent work, Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Sin. What follows is that portion of my masters thesis which deals with Edwards's ordering of the decree (This portion is in the middle of a chapter, so some references may presuppose an earlier reference that does not appear below. Please let me know if I could help by clarifying at any point.):

The Ordering of God’s Decree[1]

There are two basic views of how the decrees of election and reprobation should be ordered with reference to the decree of the Fall. They are supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism. Supralapsarianism holds that the decrees of election and reprobation occurred before (supra) the decree of the Fall (lapsus). Infralapsarianism holds that the decrees of election and reprobation occurred after (infra) the decree of the Fall (lapsus).

Edwards's ordering has been viewed differently by students of his thought. John Gerstner has labeled Edwards’s view as infralapsarian.[2] Stephen Holmes has seen it as ultimately supralapsarian.[3] Oliver Crisp has assessed Edwards’s ordering as an attempt to find a middle way between infra- and supralapsarianism.[4] As the different interpretations suggest, Edwards view was complex. However, the fundamental principles behind it are quite simple.[5]

First, Edwards presupposed a clarified teleological principle, a logical symmetry between original intentions and final ends. Whatever is “first in execution is last in intention with respect to the ultimate end.”[6] In other words, God’s decree is symmetrical. Second, he presupposed an historical principle, a logical interdependence that relates all elements of the decree sequentially. Each element of God’s decree requires the subsequent decree of all the conditions necessary for its ultimate fulfillment. As we will see, it is this second premise that is the crux of his theodicy in ordering the decree of reprobation. Let's begin by examining the different interpretations of Edwards’s thought on this question.

Convinced by what he reads in no. 762 of the “Miscellanies,” Stephen Holmes has argued that Edwards was ultimately supralapsarian.[7] “Hence that sin being foreordained of God in his decree, and ordered in his providence—as we have abundant evidence from the nature of the thing, from the great ends that God had to accomplish by means of this wicked act of crucifying Christ, it being as it were the cause of all the decrees, the greatest of all decreed events, and that on which all other decreed events depend on as their main foundation, being the main thing in that greatest work of God, the work of redemption, that [which] is the end of all other works.”[8] Here Holmes reasons that if Edwards viewed redemption as the primary decree, and the decree to redeem must certainly include the sin of the cross, then “there is a sense in which Edwards must be described as uncompromisingly supralapsarian after all. Regardless of the place of the decree of reprobation, God’s first thought is emphatically that he will redeem, not that He will create.”[9]

But according to Oliver Crisp, Holmes’s interpretation is not quite accurate.[10] Two problems are evident. First, if that which is first in execution is last in intention, then, according to Holmes’s interpretation, redemption would have to be God’s last end, which contradicts Edwards’s understanding that God’s glory is his last end.[11] Second, Crisp shows that Holmes’ reading of no. 993 of the “Miscellanies” is incorrect. Edwards’s statement that “The work of redemption is the greatest work of God, and the end of all other works and all God’s decrees contained in the covenant of redemption,” which Holmes reads as affirming the ultimate priority of the decree of redemption, actually only says that the last end of God’s works is contained in the covenant of redemption.[12] But that the decree of redemption is contained in the covenant of redemption does not speak to its logical priority with regard to other decrees. Therefore, Holmes’ view that Edwards’s ordering is ultimately supralapsarian is not to be preferred.

John Gerstner has argued that Edwards was infralapsarian.[13] He is compelled by no. 704 of the “Miscellanies.” “And the decree of damnation being posterior to the consideration of the sin of men in this latter respect, clears God of any injustice in such a decree . . . Hence God’s decree of the eternal damnation of the reprobate, is not to be conceived of as prior to the fall, yea, and to the very being of the person.”[14] Edwards certainly affirms an infralapsarian decree of reprobation here, which might lead one to conclude that his ordering of election is also infralapsarian. However, as Crisp points out, Gerstner fails to deal with other writings in which Edwards clearly affirms a supralapsarian decree of election.[15] Therefore, Gerstner’s view is not to be preferred.

Crisp interprets Edwards’s ordering of the decree as both supra- and infralapsarian.[16] Edwards is sensitive to the theodicy problems raised by the doctrine of unconditional reprobation, which had historically been an aspect supralapsarianism; yet he wants to maintain the supralapsarian emphasis on the priority of the decree of election over the decree of the Fall. Therefore, he orders the decree of election supra lapsus and the decree of reprobation infra lapsus. Edwards seeks a middle way, which affirms both the priority of the decree of election over the decree of the Fall and conditional reprobation.

Edwards’s supralapsarian view of the decree of election is clear in no. 704 of the “Miscellanies.”

Hence, we may learn how much in the decree of predestination are to be considered as prior to the creation and fall of man, and how much as posterior, viz. that God’s decree to glorify his love and communicate his goodness, and to glorify his greatness and holiness, is to be considered as prior to the creation and fall of man. And because the glory of God’s love, and the communication of his goodness, necessarily implies the happiness of the creature, and gives both their being and happiness, hence the designing to communicate and glorify his goodness and love eternally to a certain number, is to be considered as prior in both those mentioned respects—to their being and fall—for such a design in the notion of it presupposes neither.[17]

God has decreed to communicate his goodness to the elect unconditionally, apart from any foreseen good works. “God, in the decree of election, is justly to be considered as decreeing the creature’s eternal happiness antecedent to any foresight of good works.”[18] According to Edwards’s second fundamental premise that a logical interdependence relates all elements of the decree sequentially, faith and good works are supposed as conditions of the later decreed scheme of redemption, which includes the Fall. But they are not conditions of the original decree to communicate divine happiness. The decree of creaturely happiness (i.e. election) does not presuppose anything more than the happiness communicated and the existence of the creatures. That happiness has existed eternally as a divine perfection. Therefore, the decree of election may be viewed as prior to the decree of redemption. According to Edwards, election is not decreed as a means of redemption; redemption is decreed as a means of election.

Further along in no. 704 we read of Edwards’s infralapsarian view of the decree of reprobation. “But nothing in the decree of reprobation is to be looked upon as antecedent in one of those respects to man’s being nor sinfulness. But whatsoever there is in this decree of evil to particular subjects, is to be considered as consequent on the decree of their creation, and permission of their fall.”[19] Again according to Edwards’s second fundamental premise, since the decree of reprobation must include a prior decree of the existence of sinful creatures, the decree of the Fall must be considered as logically prior to the decree of reprobation. Edwards explicitly states that his infralapsarian ordering of the decree of reprobation is motivated by theodicy. “The view of the sinfulness of the reprobate must be in some respect prior in the decree, to God’s decree to glorify his justice in punishing their sinfulness, because sinfulness is necessarily supposed or already put in the decree of punishing sinfulness. And the decree of damnation being posterior to the consideration of the sin of men in this latter respect, clears God of any injustice in such a decree.”[20]

God does indeed decree reprobation, but he does it in consequence to a previous decree to create a world in which non-elect creatures will exist in a fallen state. The decree of reprobation is certain to come to pass before God ever creates, but it must logically follow a prior decree to create a world of elect and non-elect creatures and permit the Fall. According to Edwards’s second fundamental principle, the decree of reprobation presupposes more than was available (i.e. the vindictive justice of God) prior to the decree to permit sin. Therefore, sin must be in view prior to its punishment. Vindictive justice or wrath has not existed eternally as a divine perfection, because sin has not existed eternally. It is the expression of the divine attribute of justice exercised against sin.

The vindictive justice of God is not to be considered as a mere or ultimate end, but as a means to an end. Indeed, God’s glorifying his justice, or rather his glorifying his holiness and greatness, has the place of a mere and ultimate end. But his glorifying his justice in punishing sin (or in exercising vindictive justice, which is the same) or by any other particular means, is not to be considered as a mere end, but a certain way or means of obtaining an end. Vindictive justice is not to be considered as a certain distinct attribute to be glorified, but as a certain way and means for the glorifying an attribute. . . . Hence God’s decree of the eternal damnation of the reprobate, is not to be conceived of as prior to the fall, yea, and to the very being of the persons.[21]

Ultimately, it seems Edwards ordered God’s decree with reference to the creation and fall of man likewise:

1. God decrees to glorify himself (i.e. all his divine perfections, which Edwards refers to as his holiness and greatness, which includes his love and justice).
2. God decrees to glorify his love through creaturely happiness (i.e. supralapsarian election).
3. God decrees to create a world of elect and non-elect creatures.
4. God decrees the Fall.
5. God decrees the redemption of the elect and the reprobation of the non-elect (i.e. infralapsarian reprobation).

Thus, Edwards maintained a supralapsarian decree of election simultaneous to an infralapsarian decree of reprobation. Election foreordains the elect’s reception of the divine happiness. Non-election foreordains the non-elect’s non-reception of the divine happiness, which is different from condemnation. The decrees of redemption and reprobation are viewed as infralapsarian. Redemption occurs in consequence to sin and is ultimately a means to the end, logically speaking, of the elect’s reception of the divine happiness. Reprobation occurs in consequence to sin and is ultimately a means to the end, logically speaking, of the non-elect’s non-reception of the divine happiness.

____________________

[1] The idea of the ordering of God’s decree should not be confused as a chronological ordering. God’s decree is from eternity. It is not conceived temporally, yet it unfolds in time. Thus there is a logical ordering of the decree which is based on its temporal unfolding (i.e. chronology). Edwards writes, “What divines intend by prior and posterior in the affair of God’s decrees, is not that one is before another in the order of time, for all are from eternity, but that we must conceive the view or consideration of one decree to be before another, inasmuch as God decrees one thing out of respect to another decree that he has made; so that one decree must be conceived of as in some sort to be the ground of another, or that God decrees one because of another, or that he would not have decreed one had he not decreed that other” (The “Miscellanies,” 501-832, “no. 704,” 314).

[2] John H. Gerstner, The Rational and Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 2 (Powhatan, VA: Berea Publications, 1991), 161.

[3] Stephen Holmes, God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000), 131.

[4] Oliver D. Crisp, Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Sin (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2005), 16.

[5] For Edwards’s extended explanation of these two principles see The “Miscellanies,” 501-832, “no. 704,” 314.

[6] Edwards, The “Miscellanies,” a-500, “no. 292,” 383. I say this is a clarified understanding because the typical teleological maxim is whatever is last in execution was first in intention. Edwards clarifies this a bit to accommodate his complex view of ends and means. “’Tis said that that which is last in execution is first in intention; which is true with respect to the end and all the proper means, but not with respect to every prerequisite condition. Thus we ben’t to conceive that God first intended a man’s conversion before he intended his creation, though his conversion be last in execution, for creation is not the proper means of his conversion; nor it can’t properly be said that God created him that he might be converted. ’Tis true that man’s creation and fall were intended last with respect to his last end, but not with respect to his subordinate ends; because they are proper means of the last ends, but not [of] his third or fourth or fifth end—for at this rate, man was created for this end, that he might repent! But we are to conceive of things in this order: that that is first in execution is last in intention with respect to the ultimate end; that that is second in execution is last in intention with respect to the next end, etc” (Ibid.). For an extended treatment of Edwards understanding of ends see Jonathan Edwards, “Dissertation I, The End for Which God Created the World,” Ethical Writings, ed. Paul Ramsey, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, gen. ed. John E. Smith, vol. 8 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 405-15.

[7] Holmes, God of Grace and God of Glory, 131.

[8] Edwards, The “Miscellanies,” 501-832, “no. 762,” 408.

[9] Holmes, God of Grace and God of Glory, fn. 21, 131. In support of this thesis, Holmes also references Jonathan Edwards, The "Miscellanies," 833-1152, ed. Amy Plantinga Pauw, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, gen. ed. Harry S. Stout, vol. 20 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), “no. 993,” entitled, “The Work of Redemption the Greatest Work of God, and the End of All Other Works and All God’s Decrees Contained in the Covenant of Redemption,” According to Holmes, Edwards argues for the decree of redemption being prior to the decree of creation, which is a typical supralapsarian understanding. However, Crisp points out that Edwards is not asserting that redemption itself is the greatest end of all God’s works, but that the greatest end of God—his glory—is contained in the work of redemption (Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Sin, 17). Edwards distinguishes between the decreed end of God (primarily, his glory) and the decreed works of providence by which God accomplishes that end (primarily, redemption).

[10] Crisp, Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Sin, 17.

[11] “For it appears that all that is ever spoken of in the Scripture as an ultimate end of God’s works is included in that one phrase, ‘the glory of God’; which is the name by which the last end of God’s works is most commonly called in Scripture: and seems to be the name which most aptly signifies the thing” (Edwards, “Dissertation I, The End for Which God Created the World,” 526).

[12] Edwards, The "Miscellanies," 833-1152, “no. 993,” 323.

[13] Gerstner, The Rational and Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 2:161.

[14] Edwards, The “Miscellanies,” 501-832, “no. 704,” 316-17.

[15] Crisp, Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Sin, 16.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Edwards, The “Miscellanies,” 501-832, 317.

[18] Ibid., “no. 700,” 282-83.

[19] Ibid., 317.

[20] Ibid., “no. 704,” 315-16.

[21] Ibid., “ no. 704,” 316-17.

CRITIQUING BEN WITHERINGTON'S COMMENTS AGAINST GOD BEING HIS OWN END IN ALL HE DOES (pt. 2)

Continued from part 1 . . .

Dr. Witherington writes (from his first comment under this post):

If you ask the question how could God want to glorify something outside of himself, then of course you are not paying attention to what Psalm 8 says which says he crowned us with glory.

Furthermore, the NT is all about our coming to share in glory--- look at 2 Cor. 4.17-- 'our light and momentary sufferings are achieving an eternal glory for us that outweighs the suffering'. What Paul is referring to is our regaining the glory we lost in the fall, by being conformed to the image of God's Son.

The glorification of human beings is completed when we are raised from the dead and are finally fully conformed to the image of our Savior.

Notice as well that our glorification is not only intended by God in 2 Cor. 4, it brings God glory to do this for us. In other words this is not a zero sum game-- you are not subtracting from God's glory by talking about the numerous passages in the Bible which talk about God sanctifying. loving, honoring, and yes glorifying us, not in the sense of praising us, but in the sense of making us like God's Son both inwardly and outwardly.

Given Dr. Witherington's comments here, I can only conclude that he has either not read or has forgotten one of the primary Calvinist treatments on the subject, Jonathan Edwards's dissertation, "The End for Which God Created the World," which is the primary extra-biblical text for Piper, Schreiner, and Burk.

As Edwards demonstrates, the question is not how God could want to glorify something outside himself? The Bible is clear. God glorifies his creation. But the question is what is the ultimate end of God in all he does, including glorifying his creation?

In the introduction to his dissertation, Edwards makes important distinctions in order to describe the ordering of events in God's decree, helping us understand logical and axiological priorities in the purposes of God. There are four categories of "ends," which work under the two categories of priority above:

Axiological

• Inferior end- valued consequentially
  
• Chief end- valued in itself
  

Logical

• Subordinate end- logically prior to another end
  
• Ultimate end- logically last end

An ultimate end is always chief. But a chief end could either be ultimate or subordinate. A subordinate end could either be chief or inferior. And an inferior end must always be subordinate.

Dr. Witherington's comment assumes no such distinctions. Given that he intends to distinguish his own view with the Calvinist view, he must be implying that if an event is an end of God, then it is, in Edwardsian terms, an ultimate end. In other words it must be the last end in the chain of events and, since an ultimate end is always chief, it must also be valued in itself. If it isn't, then, Witherington implies, it cannot be considered a divine end, hence the charge that because the Scriptures teach that the glorification of creation is an end of God, then God cannot also be his own end. But this is not the Calvinist/Edwardsian understanding.

According to Edwards, God's desire to glorify his creation is indeed one of his ends. But it is a subordinate/chief end. In other words, it is an end that, while not the last logical end in the chain of divine purpose (i.e. subordinate), is valuable in itself (i.e. chief). In other words, the love of God expressed to his creation in redeeming it from sin and glorifying it is certainly an end which is valuable in itself (i.e. a chief end), but that does not require that it be the last or ultimate end.

So when the Calvinist affirms that God's ultimate end in all he does is himself (i.e. upholding and displaying his own glory), he is NOT saying that no other ends exist. Furthermore, he is NOT saying that no other end, like the redemptive love of God demonstrated in Jesus Christ, has value in itself (as claimed here). He is simply saying that all other ends are subordinate to the ultimate end in logical priority. In that sense, and in that sense alone, are those other ends to be considered means to the ultimate end. Therefore, Witherington's argument is lacking on this point.

Stay tuned for part 3 . . .

FRIDAY EDWARDS QUOTE: On the Stewardship of Time

First, I apologize for last week. If you read this blog regularly you probably noticed that last Friday I didn't post an Edwards's quote. There is no excuse, but there is a reason: sleep deprivation. With a newborn in the house, blogging has had to take a back seat. Last Friday, I just couldn't muster the energy to do it. Again, apologies.

Today was a good day. It was Edwards's day in my study schedule. I spent most of my time reading through the little collection of essays edited by Paul Helm and Oliver Crisp in Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, which, at $99.95, is the most expensive paperback I've ever purchased. I was particularly stimulated by Crisp's article on Edwards's occasionalism. I hope to post a series on that subject soon.

Today I also received Edwards's The Life of David Brainerd, volume 7 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (Yale Edition) from Amazon. Regular price: $100.00. My price: $24.00! I found it by God's good providence a few days ago. It is technically used but in unused condition. There is a tear and crinkle in the dust jacket, but I'll just call Yale University Press on Monday and have them send me a new one. They've always been really good about that. What a deal!

Plundering through my new treasure chest, I found this quote. Edwards records from Brainerd's diary (p. 433 of The Life of Bavid Brainerd, vol. 7 of the Yale Edition):

Saturday, October 11. Towards night was seized with an ague, which was followed with a hard fever and considerable pain: Was treated with great kindness, and was ashamed to see so much concern about so unworthy a creature as I knew myself to be. Was in a comfortable frame of mind, wholly submissive with regard to life or death. It was indeed a peculiar satisfaction to me to think that it was not my concern or business to determine whether I should live or die. I likewise felt peculiarly satisfied while under this uncommon degree of disorder; being now fully convinced of my being really weak and unable to perform my work; whereas at other times my mind was perplexed with fears that I was a misimprover of time by conceiting I was sick when I was not in reality so. Oh, how precious is time! And how guilty it makes me feel when I think I have trifled away and misimproved it, or neglected to fill up each part of it with duty to the utmost of my ability and capacity!

Brainerd was a missionary to the Indians in New England. He contracted Tuberculosis early in his ministry. It eventually killed him while he lived under the care of the Edwards's.

Brainerd's diary entry really strikes at the heart of the frustration I think many ministers experience. There simply is not enough time to get everything done. That means it is imperative that ministers be wise in the use of their time. They must be able to prioritize things well and be disciplined to do what they have set out to do when they have set out to do it. But even the wisest of ministers will, if his heart is truly in his work, I think, always feel a bit pressed for time. Edwards recognized the importance of managing his time well early in his ministry making a personal resolution:

5. Resolved, never to lose one moment of time; but improve it the most profitable way I possibly can.

CRITIQUING BEN WITHERINGTON'S COMMENTS AGAINST GOD BEING HIS OWN END IN ALL HE DOES (pt. 1)

Recently Arminian theologian, Ben Witherington, posted an article on his blog entitled "For God so loved Himself?" Is God a Narcissist?. In it, cuing off Tom Schreiner's new book New Testament Theology: Magnifying God in Christ, he argued against the idea that God is his own end in all he does. A couple good responses were offered by Denny Burke and John Piper.

Dave Cramer pointed out, in the comments under my post on the topic, that Dr. Witherington offered some further explanations in comments under his article that are worth considering. Dave wrote:

If I may, I think it might benefit your readers to take a look at Witherington's comments section under his post. While you may not all agree with his conclusions, I think some of his exegetical and theological work on this topic is important to wrestle through.

In this series of posts I would like to critique each of the points Dr. Witherington makes in his comments under his article. We will begin with the first challenging question Dr. Witherington received and his response.

A reader asked:

How do you take the last phrase of Colossians 1:16 that says all things were created through Christ and for Christ? I take that to mean for his glory, but would you disagree? How do you take the word for there?

Dr. Witherington responded:

Col. 1.16 mentions nothing about glory at all. The issue is the origin of all things (from the one who is the image of the invisible God) and the end of all things (for him).

Let's take an analogy. I have a good friend who created a beautiful drawing especially for me. He did not create it to glorify me or to glorify himself, he did it simply because he was a friend and wanted to express his love. He created it so that I would have something that belonged to me which came from him.

Similarly, all of creation was created 'for him', that is in order to belong to Christ. The issue of glorification, whether self-glorification or some other sort is not raised by this verse.

My critique:

In my estimation the question is good. Dr. Witherington responds in part by saying that the text in question is only meant to teach the origin and end of creation not that creation exists to glorify Christ. But is the text simply meant to give us an explanation of the origin and end of all things? Those concepts are certainly included, but are they the main point? Let's examine the text. Colossians 1:15-20 reads:

15 He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation. 16 For by him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things were created through him and for him. 17 And he is before all things, and in him all things hold together. 18 And he is the head of the body, the church. He is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in everything he might be preeminent. 19 For in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, 20 and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross.

The pericope begins with the declaration in verse 15a that Christ "is the image of the invisible God." In other words, that which was fundamentally invisible, namely God, has become visible to us in Christ. John describes this same phenomenon in John 1:18, "No one has ever seen God; the only God, who is at the Father's side, he has made him known." When the Son of God became flesh, what had been previously invisible (i.e. spiritual only) took on visibility (i.e. humanity). So we see Paul beginning this section not with an explanation of origins but a declaration of the revelation of the invisible God in the incarnation of Jesus Christ.

Next Paul says in verse 15b that Christ is "the firstborn of all creation." What does he mean by that? Does he mean that the Son was created first? No. The Son is eternal God (cf. John 1:1). Is he then referring to the birth of the incarnate Son, Jesus Christ? That can't be it, since Jesus was not born first. His birth occurred long after the creation of the first humans. So what does he mean? He means that Christ is preeminent, supreme over all things. He is the "firstborn" in the sense that he has priority, honor, and highest rank in the family of God.

Paul then declares in verse 16 that all things were created by the Son. I remember looking at this passage with a Jehovah's Witness one Saturday morning last spring. She pointed to Colossians 1:15b and said, "See, Jesus is the firstborn of creation. He was created by God first." I pointed to verse 16a, "For by him all things were created," and asked how the Son could have been created, if ALL things were created by him? Did he create himself? I don't think she understood my point. Fundamentally, what Paul is saying in verse 16 is that Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son who has revealed the invisible God to us, is himself the Creator God. He is the source of all creation, as Dr. Witherington affirms.

But he is also the reference point of the creation, a concept which, while including the idea that Christ is the goal or end of creation, also includes the idea that creation is structured around the Son so that it derives its meaning, significance, and value through its relation to him. In verse 16b Paul says, "All things were created through him and for him." Notice the two prepositions, "through" and "for." The Greek reads, "ta panta di' autou kai eis auton ektistai," which translates word-for-word, "All things through him and for him have been created." The preposition di', "through," with the genitive case personal pronoun autou, "him," is used in the sense of agency, which is in line with Witherington's conclusion that Paul means to explain the origin of all things (Wallace, 368). All things were created through the agency of him, an agency which is intermediate given that the verb is passive voice (Wallace, 433). But the preposition eis, "for," with the accusative case personal pronoun auton, "him," could either be used in a spatial, temporal, purpose, result, reference/respect, or advantage sense (Wallace, 369). We can eliminate the spatial and temporal uses at the start. Surely Paul does not mean to say all things are created in the direction of Christ (i.e. spatial) or throughout the time of Christ (i.e. temporal). And the uses of purpose (i.e. all things were created in order to Christ) and result (i.e. all things were created so that Christ) don't seem to fit either. The best interpretation is the sense of either advantage and/or reference/respect. All things were created for the benefit of Christ and with reference to Christ. Christ is the heir of all things. As Paul says in Ephesians 1 the Son gave up his life for our redemption "to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth. In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will, so that we who were the first to hope in Christ might be to the praise of his glory" (Eph 1:10-12). Christ is also the referent that gives meaning to the created order. He is the fundamental premise, presupposition, starting point from and around which creation has been ordered.

That Christ is the prime referent of the universe, the preeminent One who gives all things meaning and the One who is an eternal inheritance for his people, certainly seems to suggest that God is his own end in the work of creation. All things have meaning and value insofar as they relate to God. Otherwise, everything is meaningless. Furthermore, it serves to demonstrate the Edwardsian idea that God's making himself his ultimate end in creation in no way militates against his love for the creation. In fact, it is the basis for that love! The proper ordering of the creation so that it is in peaceful harmony with itself and it's Maker is a profound act of divine love. And since the preeminence of Christ is fundamental to the created order, then the preeminence of Christ is also fundamental to the expression of God's love for it.

This idea of the preeminence of Christ over all things is driven home by Paul in verses 17-20:

17 And he is before all things, and in him all things hold together. 18 And he is the head of the body, the church. He is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in everything he might be preeminent. 19 For in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, 20 and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross.

Given the reasons above I would disagree with Dr. Witherington's conclusion that Colossians 1:16 is only meant to teach the origin and end of all things. In context, it would appear that the text is meant to reinforce the declaration that Christ is preeminent, supreme over all things.

Dr. Witherington began his answer by saying that the word glory was not used in Colossians 1:16. That is true. But to think that a concept does not occur unless a particular word for that concept is used in a text is to fall prey to the classic lexico-conceptual fallacy. A concept like glory can certainly be communicated even if the word glory is not used in the passage. Given the passage's main theme of the preeminence of Christ, it appears that this is a classic example of just that. The doctrine that God has purposed the preeminence of Christ in all things is, fundamentally, equivalent to Edwardsian idea that God is his own end in all he does.

In conclusion, Dr. Witherington offered an analogy in order to explain the meaning of the verse. He wrote:

Let's take an analogy. I have a good friend who created a beautiful drawing especially for me. He did not create it to glorify me or to glorify himself, he did it simply because he was a friend and wanted to express his love. He created it so that I would have something that belonged to me which came from him.

Let's look at the way Dr. Witherington is using the terms "glorify" and "love" in the analogy. He seems to imply that the concept of divine love can be isolated from the concept of divine glory. In other words, he seems to suggest it is possible for love to be expressed without respect to the expression of glory. Reformed-Edwardsian theologians would deny such a possibility. Instead, they would define divine love as an aspect of divine glory. Love is one of the many perfections of God. When God loves his creation, he does it, by necessity, to his own glory.

We must remember the most fundamental gift God gives his people is himself. In Genesis 17:7 God told Abraham, "I will establish my covenant between me and you and your offspring after you throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be God to you and to your offspring after you." God promised Abraham that he would give him the gift of his special holy presence. God would be with him as his God. In Revelation 21:1-4 we read of the consummation of that promise:

Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and there was no longer any sea. I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her husband. And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, “Now the dwelling of God is with men, and he will live with them. They will be his people, and God himself will be with them and be their God. He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away.”

The gift of redemption, the gift of eternal life, is the gift of God's holy presence among his people. Therefore, that God is his own end in all he does, that he is fundamentally motivated by the desire to display his glory, should be cause for great delight among his people. It is the glorious presence of God, the beatific vision, that is our hope. The gift of access into God's glory is the love of God to us. The Apostle John continues:

The city does not need the sun or the moon to shine on it, for the glory of God gives it light, and the Lamb is its lamp. The nations will walk by its light, and the kings of the earth will bring their splendor into it. On no day will its gates ever be shut, for there will be no night there. The glory and honor of the nations will be brought into it. Nothing impure will ever enter it, nor will anyone who does what is shameful or deceitful, but only those whose names are written in the Lamb's book of life.

Far from detracting from the love of God, the shining forth of the glory of God compels God's people to come to him and worship him, giving back to him the gifts he's given to them by his grace.

In conclusion, Dr. Witherington's comments with respect to the question raised from Colossians 1:16 are, in my estimation, unconvincing. Stay tuned for part 2 . . .