Today Dr. Al Mohler, president and prof at SBTS, posted a blog entitled Ready for This? Harvard's E. O. Wilson Writes to an Imaginary Southern Baptist Pastor.
Dr. Mohler writes of Professor Wilson,
The professor's letter is a call to set aside differences in worldview, in order to save the creation from further environmental harm. I am glad that Dr. Mohler has affirmed the honesty of the letter. Wilson has clearly affirmed the radical difference in our worldviews. I am also glad that Dr. Mohler clearly affirms our responsibility to be environmentally responsible as creatures of God. Mohler writes,
Then Wilson is quoted as writing,
Last night I read through Jonathan Edwards's, The Nature of True Virtue again. Interestingly, Wilson's ethical argument is based on the universality of a paricular value, which he is describing as virtuous. According to Edwards, that is exactly what the 18th century unitarians and deists--the secular humanists of his day--were doing with regard to virtue.
While Evangelicals and secular humanists should do everything they can to work together for the benefit of the creation, Professor Wilson's ethical argument is radically flawed in the same way that Edwards's opponents' views were flawed. Edwards's argument clearly demonstrates that Wilson's statement "The defense of living nature [or creation] is a universal value," can only be true as a dictate of virtue, if it has primary reference to God. Dr. Wilson is declaring virtue without reference to God. (Wilson might object that God doesn't exist, but that would not solve the dilemma at hand. Without God humanity cannot know universal principles with certainty, because humanity doesn't comprehend the universe.) Edwards offers two major problems with what Wilson's ethic: (1) Universality requires reference to God and, since all agree that true virtue must have respect to a principle of universality, (2) Any virtue that does not begin with God cannot be truly (or ultimately) virtuous.
First, in order for a virtue to be universal it must have some reference to universal existence (what Edwards calls "General Being" or "Being simply considered"), which, I would submit, is the definition of universal. After presenting an argument from reason for defining true virtue (or true moral beauty) as "benevolence to Being in general" or "that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a general good will," Edwards opens chapter 2 writing,
The universalilty of anything requires regard to that Being who has "the greatest share of universal existence." Therefore any virtuous act that falls short of a regard to God cannot be regarded as universal, because "all other being, even that of all created things whatsoever, throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the Divine Being."
Also, Edwards argues that in order for virtue to be true virtue, it must essentially be grounded in a primary regard for God, or, to say it another way, it must demonstrate that it is valuable because God is valuable. Edwards writes further,
So we see that the ideas Edwards was dealing with 250 years ago are the same basic ideas used in ethical arguments today.
I wholeheartedly agree with Mohler's willingness to interact and, possibly, cooperate with secular humanists in the quest for environmental responsibility. Evangelicalism has been far too slow to acknowledge environmental problems (sins?) and engage our consumer culture on that front.
However, Wilson's view, that, while we disagree on many ethical issues, we are essentially working from the same ethical standard with regard to this issue, is wrong. About this ethical issue he writes, "It doesn't rise from, nor does it promote, any religious or ideological dogma. Rather, it serves without discrimination the interests of all humanity." No, it does rise from, and promote religious and idealogical dogma, whether we are willing to admit it or not. Ultimately, for environmentally responsible actions to be truly virtuous, they must be viewed as reaching beyond "the interests of all humanity," to the interests of God primarily, and the interests of humanity, consequentially. Any other motivation, while capable of leading to good ends (i.e. responsible care for the creation), should not be thought of as truly virtuous, unless mankind be thought of as God. Edwards closes chapter 2 of True Virtue writing,
Dr. Mohler writes of Professor Wilson,
Professor Wilson was raised in a Southern Baptist home, but he abandoned belief in God many years ago. In his academic career, he has emerged as the most ardent defender of sociobiology and as an evangelist for evolutionary thought. Thus, his current proposal comes as something of a shock.
The professor's letter is a call to set aside differences in worldview, in order to save the creation from further environmental harm. I am glad that Dr. Mohler has affirmed the honesty of the letter. Wilson has clearly affirmed the radical difference in our worldviews. I am also glad that Dr. Mohler clearly affirms our responsibility to be environmentally responsible as creatures of God. Mohler writes,
This may shock Dr. Wilson, but I really think he is on to something here. A biblical environmentalism begins with the fact that the world is the arena of God's glory -- creation glorifies the Creator. We will answer to the Creator for our use and enjoyment of the created order, and for our stewardship of the earth and all that is within it. This surely includes the glory of God revealed in what Professor Wilson calls "biodiversity."I agree.
Then Wilson is quoted as writing,
Do these differences in worldview separate us in all things? They do not. You and I and every other human being strive for the same imperatives of security, freedom of choice, personal dignity, and a cause to believe in that is larger than ourselves. Let us see, then, if we can meet on the near side of metaphysics in order to deal with the real world we share. You have the power to help solve a great problem about which I care deeply. I hope you have the same concern. I suggest that we set aside our differences in order to save the Creation. The defense of living nature is a universal value. It doesn't rise from, nor does it promote, any religious or ideological dogma. Rather, it serves without discrimination the interests of all humanity. Pastor, we need your help. The Creation--living nature--is in deep trouble. (emphasis mine).
Last night I read through Jonathan Edwards's, The Nature of True Virtue again. Interestingly, Wilson's ethical argument is based on the universality of a paricular value, which he is describing as virtuous. According to Edwards, that is exactly what the 18th century unitarians and deists--the secular humanists of his day--were doing with regard to virtue.
While Evangelicals and secular humanists should do everything they can to work together for the benefit of the creation, Professor Wilson's ethical argument is radically flawed in the same way that Edwards's opponents' views were flawed. Edwards's argument clearly demonstrates that Wilson's statement "The defense of living nature [or creation] is a universal value," can only be true as a dictate of virtue, if it has primary reference to God. Dr. Wilson is declaring virtue without reference to God. (Wilson might object that God doesn't exist, but that would not solve the dilemma at hand. Without God humanity cannot know universal principles with certainty, because humanity doesn't comprehend the universe.) Edwards offers two major problems with what Wilson's ethic: (1) Universality requires reference to God and, since all agree that true virtue must have respect to a principle of universality, (2) Any virtue that does not begin with God cannot be truly (or ultimately) virtuous.
First, in order for a virtue to be universal it must have some reference to universal existence (what Edwards calls "General Being" or "Being simply considered"), which, I would submit, is the definition of universal. After presenting an argument from reason for defining true virtue (or true moral beauty) as "benevolence to Being in general" or "that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a general good will," Edwards opens chapter 2 writing,
From what has been said, 'tis evident that true virtue must chiefly consist in love to God; the Being of beings, infinitely the greatest and best of beings . . . It was observed that the first objective ground of that love, wherein true virtue consists, is Being, simply considered: and as a necessary consequence of this, that being who has the most of being, or the greatest share of universal existence, has proportionably the greatest share of virtuous benevolence, so far as such being is exhibited to the faculties of our minds, other things being equal. But God has infinitely the greatest share of existence, or is infinitely the greatest being. So that all other being, even that of all created things whatsoever, throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the Divine Being (emphasis mine).
The universalilty of anything requires regard to that Being who has "the greatest share of universal existence." Therefore any virtuous act that falls short of a regard to God cannot be regarded as universal, because "all other being, even that of all created things whatsoever, throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the Divine Being."
Also, Edwards argues that in order for virtue to be true virtue, it must essentially be grounded in a primary regard for God, or, to say it another way, it must demonstrate that it is valuable because God is valuable. Edwards writes further,
Therefore he that has true virtue, consists in benevolence to Being in general, and in that complacence in virtue, moral beauty, and benevolence to virtuous being, must necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence [love to Being simply considered] and complacence [love to being due to that being's moral beauty]. And all true virtue must radically and essentially, and as it were summarily, consist in this. Because God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other being, but he is the head of the universal system of existence; the foundation and fountain of all being and all beauty; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all is most absolutely and perfectly dependent; of whom, and through whom, and to whom is all being and all perfection; and whose being and beauty is as it were the sum and comprehension of all existence and excellence: much more than the sun is the fountain and summary comprehension of all the light and brightness of the day (bracketed info mine).
So we see that the ideas Edwards was dealing with 250 years ago are the same basic ideas used in ethical arguments today.
I wholeheartedly agree with Mohler's willingness to interact and, possibly, cooperate with secular humanists in the quest for environmental responsibility. Evangelicalism has been far too slow to acknowledge environmental problems (sins?) and engage our consumer culture on that front.
However, Wilson's view, that, while we disagree on many ethical issues, we are essentially working from the same ethical standard with regard to this issue, is wrong. About this ethical issue he writes, "It doesn't rise from, nor does it promote, any religious or ideological dogma. Rather, it serves without discrimination the interests of all humanity." No, it does rise from, and promote religious and idealogical dogma, whether we are willing to admit it or not. Ultimately, for environmentally responsible actions to be truly virtuous, they must be viewed as reaching beyond "the interests of all humanity," to the interests of God primarily, and the interests of humanity, consequentially. Any other motivation, while capable of leading to good ends (i.e. responsible care for the creation), should not be thought of as truly virtuous, unless mankind be thought of as God. Edwards closes chapter 2 of True Virtue writing,
Hence it appears that these schemes of religion or moral philosophy, which, however well in some respects they may treat of benevolence to mankind, and other virtues depending on it, yet have not a supreme regard to God, and love to him, laid in the foundation and all other virtues handled in a connection with this, and in subordination to this, are no true schemes of philosophy, but are fundamentally and essentially defective. And whatever other benevolence or generosity toward mankind, and other virtues, or moral qualifications which go by that name, any are possessed of that are not attended with a love to God, which is altogether above them, and to which they are subordinate, and on which they are dependent, there is nothing of the nature of true virtue or religion in them. And it may be asserted in general that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the first and the last, or which, with regard to their exercises in general, have not their first foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not respect to God as the supreme end.




2 comments:
"Any other motivation, while capable of leading to good ends (i.e. responsible care for the creation), should not be thought of as truly virtuous, unless mankind be thought of as God."
Good stuff, Rev. Bennett. I think Christians too often look at anything environmental and consider it as tree-hugger theology. If God pronounced the creation good and it tells of His glory (Ps 19:1) then we should do our best take care of it.
I am not sure how far we go into this with regards to treatment of animals, but it's something that I have often wondered about. We wouldn't flippantly kill a dog or cat, but we will an ant or a fly. Are not both the creation of God?
Your thoughts on that...
I think it has to do with the cuteness factor. If an animal is cute and fluffy and doesn't view me as a dinner option, then it should be loved and cuddled. If it doesn't meet either of those criteria, it should be SQUASHED INTO ETERNAL EXTINCTION as quickly as possible.
Moooooooooooaaaaahhhaaaahhhhaaaa!
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